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ABSTRACT 
Information Leakage and Stackelberg Leadership in Cournot Competition 
by 
LUO Huajiang 
Master of Philosophy 
In duopoly Cournot competition with sequential moves, it is well known that each 
player prefers Stackelberg leadership without demand uncertainty. We study the same 
game when the demand is uncertain, and firms possess some private information about 
the uncertain demand. There are two effects of private information in this game. First, 
when the Stackelberg leader moves first, its private information is leaked to, or inferred 
by the Stackelberg follower via the output quantity. Hence, the Stackelberg follower 
makes decision based on more accurate information than the leader. Second, the leader 
incurs a cost to signal its information to the follower, which hurts the leader. Both 
effects hurt the Stackelberg leader, then the follower may earn more ex ante profit than 
the leader. When the demand is continuous, Gal-or (1987) assumes that firms follow 
linear decision rules and reports that the follower always sets a higher output quantity 
than the leader and earns more profit than the leader. However, our study finds that it 
is true if and only if the demand is unboundedly distributed. Otherwise, the Stackelberg 
leader's Pareto-optimal output quantity is not linear in its private information unless it 
observes the highest signal, and the follower does not always earn more ex ante profit 
than the leader. When the demand is discretely distributed, we study how the number 
of demand states influences the effect of cost of signaling. With more demand states, 
the effect of cost of signaling on the leader becomes more significant, and the follower 
may earn more ex ante profit than the leader. 
 
Keywords: Information leakage, The First-mover advantage, Cournot competition, 
Signaling 
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1 INTRODUCTION
The importance of information to a rm is apparent in competitive economic
environment and information society, especially for rms which sell products in
market with uncertain demand. More accurate information can help decision
makers better informed of the uncertain demand, hence rms can make decisions
more wisely. The information can be sales data, sales forecasts, and so on. In
reality, a rms information may be leaked to other rms directly or indirectly,
hence the rm may su¤er the information leakage. Singer (1999) gives an example
of information leakage. The sales information of music retailer Newbury Comics
was leaked to other retailers like Wal-Mart via the SoundScan, an information and
sales tracking system. Wal-Mart can use the information for inventory planning
and replenishment. Hence, Wal-Mart beneted from the leaked information, and
Newbury Comics lost the control of its valuable information.
We consider a Stackelberg competition model, in which two identical rms (a
leader and a follower) sell homogeneous product to customers and decide their
respective output quantity sequentially. If rms have complete information about
the market, the leader earns more prot than the follower and both of them prefer
Stackelberg leadership. This is true because as a leader, the rm can preempt its
follower by investing a larger capacity, which guarantees a higher prot than the
follower.
However, in an incomplete information environment where each rm pos-
sesses some private information about the uncertain demand, rmspreference
for Stackelberg leadership is not apparent. They will update their beliefs about
the uncertain demand based on information available and, then make decisions
accordingly. As a rational player, the follower knows that the leader decides its
output quantity based on its private information, and will try to infer the leaders
private information from its output quantity. The leaders private information is
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leaked to, or inferred by the follower via the leaders output quantity. The leader
only knows its own information, while the follower knows its own information and
the inferred information from the leaders output quantity, hence makes decision
based on more accurate information than the leader. The follower may benet
from the e¤ect of more accurate information.
The leader knows the followers rational inference and hence makes decision
by taking the followers inference into consideration. That is, there is a signaling
game between the leader and the follower. Di¤erent from the case without asym-
metric information, the leaders output quantity is an instrument to signal its
information. As we know, signaling is costly, the leader incurs a cost of signaling.
The leader is worse o¤ with the e¤ect of cost of signaling. On the contrary, the
follower is better o¤ with it.
In sum, there are two e¤ects in the game, the e¤ect of the followers more
accurate information and the e¤ect of cost of signaling. With these two e¤ects,
the follower position may be improved, and the follower may make more prot
than the leader. In this thesis, we study how the leaders information is leaked
to the follower, and how rmsprivate information a¤ects rmsdecisions and
prots. We also explore whether rms still prefer the Stackelberg leadership
when they possess some private information.
We assume that the demand is linear and uncertain. Firms observe private in-
formation about the uncertain demand and choose their respective output quan-
tity sequentially. Our model setup is similar as Gal-ors (1987), in which the
demand is continuously distributed. Continuous demand distribution is widely
used in the literature, such as Li (2002), Zhang (2002), Mishra et al. (2007),
Li and Zhang (2008), Ha et al. (2011), Shang et al. (2015). She assumes that
rms follow linear decision rules and nds that the follower always earns more
prot than the leader. However, we nd that Gal-ors results does not hold all
the time. Firmsdecisions and ex ante prot depend on the highest demand. If
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the demand is continuously distributed in an unbounded interval, rmsoutput
quantities are linear in the signals and the leader incurs the highest cost to signal
its information to the follower and earns less ex ante prot than the follower.
Both rms prefer to be the Stackelberg follower. This is consistent with Gal-ors
results. However, if the uncertain demand is distributed in a bounded interval,
rms does not follow linear decision rules and the leader may earn more ex ante
prot than the follower. We know that there are two e¤ects in the game. We are
interested in how each e¤ect inuences rmsdecisions and their preference for
Stackelberg leadership. So we build two benchmark models to compare the two
e¤ects.
We are also interested in that if the demand is discretely distributed, how the
number of demand states a¤ects the leaders cost of signaling and both rms
decisions. The discrete demand information structure is also widely used in the
literature, Anand and Goyal (2009), Kong, et al. (2013), Ha and Tong (2008)
and economics literature. If the demand distribution is discrete, when the leader
observes high demand, it will take an ex post e¢ cient action. However, when the
leader observes a lower state, to separate from the high state, the leader will set
a lower output quantity to prevent high type leader from mimicing it, thus the
leader incurs the cost of signaling. If the number of demand states is two, only
the low type may incur the cost of signaling. If the number of demand states is
three, both the middle type and the low type leader may incur cost to signal its
information, and then incur a higher cost.
Our goal in this work is to explore rmspreference for the Stackelberg lead-
ership in Cournot competition with private information. Thus, the paper bridges
and makes a contribution to two streams of research: (1) rst-mover advantage
and (2) information leakage between competing rms. There have been numerous
papers on rst-mover advantage. There have been fewer works on information
leakage between rms competing in output quantity. How the information leakage
3
a¤ects rmspreference for the Stackelberg leadership has not been explored.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3 is the model setup. Section 4 and section 5 discuss the impact
of demand support and number of demand states on the Stackelberg leadership.
Section 6 concludes the main results in this thesis.
4
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Our work is related to two streams of research. the rst stream studies the
information leakage and the second strand of research is about the rst-mover
advantage.
2.1 Information Leakage
Information leakage is a hot topic in recent literature. Lee and Whang (2000)
give examples of information leakage in supply chain, in which a supplier sup-
plies a critical part to two manufacturers competing in the nal product market.
Either the manufacturer would not share information with the supplies unless it
guaranteed that the information is not leaked to the other manufacturer. How-
ever, the shared information may be leaked via the observable action that the
supplier reacts to the information. Li (2002) considers a supply chain with one
manufacturer and multiple retailers. The retailers compete on output quantity
and are endowed with private information about the uncertain demand and their
cost. He nds that the leakage e¤ect discourages the retailers from sharing their
demand information with the manufacturer while encouraging them to share their
cost information. Zhang (2002) considers a supply chain with one manufacturer
and two retailers competing on either the quantity or the price. The retailers
sell di¤erentiated products and possess some private demand information. He
nds that complete information sharing can be achieved through side payment if
their information is statistically less accurate or they benet more from the ef-
fect of information leakage. Li and Zhang (2008) consider a decentralized supply
chain in which one manufacturer supplies to many retailers competing in price.
They study the impact of di¤erent types of condentiality agreements on retail-
ersincentive to share their information with manufacturer. With condentiality,
though retailers cannot observe the shared information directly, they can infer it
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from the manufacturers wholesale price. Anand and Goyal (2009) explore how
information leakage a¤ects the material ows and information ows of a supply
chain with horizontal competition. The informed rms private information may
be leaked to the uninformed one via their common upstream supplier. As a result
of information leakage, the informed rm may choose to conceal its information
to prevent leakage. And this will leads to operational losses through material
ow distortion. Kong et al. (2013) consider a similar model to Anand and Goyal
(2009) and study the potential of revenue-sharing contracts to facilitate informa-
tion sharing in a supply chain and mitigate the negative e¤ects of information
leakage.
This line of literature concentrates on information leakage in supply chain, and
studies how the downstream rm(s)information is leaked through their upstream
rm and how information leakage a¤ects supply chain participantsdecisions and
prots. None of these papers in the literature considers the impact of information
leakage on rmspreference for Stackelberg leadership in a duopoly market.
2.2 The First-mover Advantage
First-mover advantage is that a rm can be better o¤ than its competitor as
a result of being rst to market. The rst mover and the second mover are
symmetric and the di¤erence between them is the leader commits its strategy and
moves rst. The rst-mover advantage is also known as Stackelberg leadership
(Turocy 2001). Beginning with the model introduced by von Stackelberg (1934),
which demonstrates that the leading rm can obtain higher prots than that of
the followers by committing to a high production quantity, a lot of work has
been devoted to nd out under which circumstances a rst-mover advantage can
be achieved. Gal-Or (1985) shows that the rst mover (the leader) gains higher
prots only if the actions of the leader and the follower are strategic substitutes.
Amir and Stepanova (2006) consider a di¤erentiated-product Bertrand duopoly
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game with general demand and asymmetric linear costs and nd that a rm with
su¢ ciently large cost lead over its rival has a rst-mover advantage. Rasmusen
and Yoon (2012) show that if one players information about the protability of
new markets is only modestly superior, the possibility of foreclosing the market
can lead to rst-mover advantage. Bagwell (1995) and Vardy (2004) show that the
rst-mover advantage is completely lost if the rst movers choice is imperfectly
observed or if there are observation costs.
Gal-Or (1987) studies how rmsprivate information a¤ects the rst-mover
advantage by considering a leader-follower game with output quantity as strate-
gies. She assumes the demand is linear and stochastic. Firms observe private
information about the state of demand. She also assumes that prior and posterior
distributions that generate posterior expected values are linear in the observable
signals. She concludes that based on these assumptions, rms follow linear de-
cision rules. At a pure strategy equilibrium, the follower is always able to infer
the correct private signal of the leader, unless this signal is innitely noisy. She
nds that the follower always produces higher expected output than the leader
regardless of the actual accuracies of the private signals, and earns more expected
prot than the leader for any signals they observe.
However, we nd that linear demand and linear prior and posterior distribu-
tions do not mean that rms follow linear decision policy. Thereby, linear decision
rules may not hold under all conditions. If so, when do the linear decision rules
hold? Does the follower still always earn more prot than the leader? As we
know, these questions havent been discussed in previous literature. We plan to
answer these questions in my thesis.
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3 MODEL SETUP
We consider a duopoly Cournot game with sequential moves, in which two rms,
rm 1 (the leader) and rm 2 (the follower), sell homogeneous products to cus-
tomers. Firm 1 makes decision rst as the Stackelberg leader and rm 2 is the
Stackelberg follower. The two rms are prot maximizers. The inverse demand
function is given by
p = A  (q1 + q2) ,
where p is the retail price, q1 and q2 are the output quantities set by rm 1 and rm
2, respectively. The intercept A is a random variable and represents uncertain
demand. Before making decisions, rm 1 and rm 2 observe private information
Y1 and Y2 about the uncertain demand, respectively. They will update their
beliefs about the demand based on information available. Each player only knows
its own information. Firms incur constant retail cost, which we normalize to zero
without loss of generality.
This is a two-stage game. Before making decisions, rms observe Y1 and Y2,
respectively. In the rst stage, The leader moves rst and decides its output
quantity q1 based on Y1. In the second stage, observing the leaders output
quantity q1, the follower will try to infer the leaders private information from
q1 and choose q2 based on its own information and the inferred information.
The rms decide their respective output quantity sequentially to maximize their
expected prot
E [1jY1] = E [q1 (A  (q1 + q2)) jY1] ;
E [2jY2; q1] = E [q2 (A  (q1 + q2)) jY2; q1] :
The sequence of event and decision is as follows:
1. The rm 1 decides output quantity q1 based on its own information Y1.
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2. Upon receiving q1, rm 2 chooses an output quantity q2 based on its own
information Y2 and information inferred from q1.
3. Demand is realized, and production is completed to meet the demand.
9
4 THE IMPACT OF DEMAND SUPPORT FOR CONTINUOUS DE-
MAND
In this section, we assume that the uncertain demand is continuously distributed
in a positive interval and the demand can be bounded or unbounded. That is, the
highest demand can be a positive nite value or positive innity. We will analyze
how the demand support a¤ects rms decisions and their expected prots.
4.1 Information Structure
The uncertain demand A consists of two parts, a deterministic part a and a
random part  representing demand uncertainty, with E [] = 0 and V ar [] =
2 > 0, i.e., A = a + . The joint probability distribution of (; Y1; Y2) satises
the following conditions:
(1) E [Yij] =  for i = 1; 2,
(2) E [jY1; Y2] = 0 + 1Y1 + a2Y2; where 0; a1 and 2 are constants,
(3) Y1; Y2 are independent and identically distributed conditional on .
Condition (1) says that Yi is an unbiased estimator of  and condition (2)
states that the conditional expectations are linear in the signals. The two con-
ditions are generally enough to include many conjugate pairs such as normal-
normal, gamma-Poisson, beta-binomial. Condition (3) says that the two rms
signals are symmetric in probability distribution. The expected conditional pre-
cision of the signal is 1
E[V ar[Yij]] . We focus on imperfect demand signal, i.e.,
E [V ar [Yij]] > 0. The two rms have same signal precision about the uncertain
demand. By Lemma 1 of Li (1985), the three conditions alone imply that
E [jYi] = E [YijYj] = 1
1 + s
Yi;
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for i 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j,
E [jY1; Y2] = 1
2 + s
(Y1 + Y2) ;
where s  E[V ar[Yij]]
V ar[]
for i 2 f1; 2g, and
E[(Yi)
2] = (1 + s)2, E[Y1Y2] = 2:
There is an issue about the nonnegativity of the uncertain demand, i.e., a + .
According to Li and Zhang (2008), for gamma-Poisson, beta-binomial, we can
easily nd a condition for the equilibrium solutions to be interior points. For
normal-normal case, if  is small relative to a, the equilibrium outcome will be
an interior-point solution for most realizations of demand uncertainty and signals.
4.2 Model Analysis
In the rst stage, the leader decides its output quantity q1 based on Y1. Though
the follower cannot observe Y1 directly, it will try to infer it from the leaders
observable action q1. How the follower infers information from q1 depends on the
its belief following a functional form P (Y1) : We restrict the search for equilibria
to the subspace where P (Y1) is a strictly increasing function of E [jY1], in other
words, q1 is related to Y1 only through a monotone relationship with E [jY1] :We
assume that the leaders decision policy takes the form of
q1 = f (E [jY1]) , this is, E [jY1] = f 1 (q1)
for some strictly increasing and di¤erentiable function f (). Observing q1, the
follower believes the leaders belief about the demand is f 1 (q1). According to
Mas-Colell et al. (1995), a separating equilibrium should satises the following
conditions,
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(C1) : The leaders strategy is optimal given the followers strategy,
(C2) : The belief function f 1 (q1) is derived from the leaders strategy,
(C3) : The followers strategy is optimal given the belief function and the
leaders strategy.
Since the leaders decision policy takes the form of q1 = f (E [jY1]), observing
a q1, the follower believes E [jY1] is f 1 (q1) condition C2 is satised.
In the second stage, observing the leaders output quantity, the follower tries
to infer the leaders private information according to the belief function f 1 (q1)
and updates its belief about the uncertain demand E [jY2; q1] = (1+s)f 1(q1)+Y22+s .
The follower chooses q2 to maximize
E [2jY2; q1] = q2 (a+ E [jY2; q1]  (q1 + q2)) :
From the rst-order condition (FOC), we get
q2 (q1; Y2) =
1
2

a  q1 + (1 + s) f
 1 (q1) + Y2
2 + s

:
Given the leaders output quantity and the belief function, the followers optimal
strategy is q2 (q1; Y2). Condition C3 is satised.
In the rst stage, the leader maximizes its prot,
E [1jY1] = E [q1 (a+    (q1 + q2 (q1; Y2))) jY1]
= q1

1
2
a+ E [jY1]  1
2
q1   1
2
1 + s
2 + s
f 1 (q1)  1
2
1
2 + s
E [Y2jY1]

:
To maximize E[1jY1] over q1, we set the rst derivative to zero, i.e.,
d
dq1
E [1jY1] = 0;
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which can be written as
d
dq1

q1

 1
2
q1   1
2
1 + s
2 + s
f 1 (q1)

+
1
2
a+ E [jY1]  1
2
1
2 + s
E [Y2jY1] = 0:
Since E [Y2jY1] = E [jY1], we replace E [Y2jY1] by E [jY1] and obtain
d
dq1

q1

 1
2
q1   1
2
1 + s
2 + s
f 1 (q1)

+
1
2
a+
1
2
3 + 2s
2 + s
E [jY1] = 0:
For q1 = f (E [jY1]) to be an equilibrium, the above equality must hold if we
replace E [jY1] by f 1 (q1), i.e.,
a  2q1 + f 1 (q1)  1 + s
2 + s
q1
d
dq1
f 1 (q1) = 0:
Solving this equation, we get the solution:
f 1(q1) =
2
  1  q1 + c  q

1   a; (1)
where  = 2+s
1+s
and c is an arbitrary constant. For any demand signal Y1, given
a c, there exists an equilibrium for the game as long as f () is increasing with
E [jY1]. So there are multiple equilibria for the game.
When there are multiple equilibria, the leader will choose a Pareto-optimal
equilibrium for its own interest if there is any. In fact, the leaders equilib-
rium prot is 1
2
q1
 
a+ 1
2
E [jY1]  q1

, which is increasing in q1 for any q1 
1
2
(a+ E [jY1]). Note that (1) implies that, for any given signal Y1, q1 is de-
creasing in c. Therefore, the leaders maximal expected prot is achieved at the
lowest constant c. Recall that to fulll the followers conjecture, we must keep
f() strictly increasing. Taking the rst-order derivative with respect to q1 on
the right hand side of equation (1), we nd that df
 1(q1)
q1
is positive if and only if
c    2
 1  1(a+ 11+s ~Y ) 1
, which holds for any q1, where ~Y is the highest demand. It
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is easy to verify that when c =   2
 1  1(a+ 11+s ~Y ) 1
, the leader achieves its maximal
expected prot and f() is strictly increasing. Thus, condition C1 is satised. We
summarize the above analysis in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The Pareto-optimal Bayesian equilibrium for the Stackelberg game
is (q1; q

2; f
 1(q1)), where q

1 satises
2
  1q

1  
2
  1
1
a+ 1
1+s
~Y
 1 (q1) = a+ E [jY1] ; (2)
and q2 satises
q2 =
1
2
0B@a  q1 +
0B@
0B@ 2
  1q

1  
1

2
  1
1
a+ 1
1+s
~Y
 1 (q1)
1CA+ 1
2 + s
Y2
1CA
1CA ;
with belief function
f 1(q1) =
2
  1q

1  
2
  1
1
a+ 1
1+s
~Y
 1  (q1)   a:
Firmsexpected prots are given by
E [1jY1] = 1
2
q1 (a+ E [jY1]  q1) ;
E [2jY2; q1] = q2

a+
Y1 + Y2
2 + s
  (q1 + q2)

:
If the leader observes the highest signal, its optimal output quantity is
q1

E
h
j ~Y
i
=
1
2

a+ E
h
j ~Y
i
;
which is exactly the highest possible output quantity (recall that any output
quantity should satisfy q1  12 (a+ E [jY1])). And the leader has no incentive
to mimic the highest signal if it observes a signal other than the highest signal.
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This coincides with the previous literature on signaling game that the highest
type signal sender takes an ex post e¢ cient action.
Corollary 1 (1) When the leader observes the highest signal ~Y , its output quan-
tity is ex post e¢ cient, i.e., q1

E
h
j ~Y
i
= 1
2

a+ E
h
j ~Y
i
.
(2) When the leader observes a signal Y1 lower than ~Y , its output quantity is
always less than 1
2
(a+ E [jY1]).
Proof. Please see the appendix.
When the leader observes a signal Y1, it has an incentive to set an output
quantity lower than 1
2
(a+ E [jY1]) to induce the follower to believe that the
leader observes a signal lower than Y1. Then the follower sets a low output
quantity. Thus the leader benets from it.
4.3 Unbounded Demand
From equation (2), we know that the highest signal plays an important role in
deciding the leaders output quantity. If the demand is unbounded, the highest
signal, ~Y , goes to positive innity, hence, the constant c in equation (1) is zero.
We nd that the leaders output quantity is linear in its private signal.
Lemma 1 If the demand is unboundedly distributed, the Pareto-optimal Bayesian
equilibrium for the Stackelberg game is (q1; q

2; f
 1(q1)), where
q1 =
1
2
1
2 + s

a+
1
1 + s
Y1

;
q2 =
1
2
1
2 + s

3 + 2s
2
a+
1 + 2s
2 (1 + s)
Y1 + Y2

:
The follower believes the leaders information is
f 1(q1) =
2
  1  q

1   a:
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Firmsprots are given by
E [1jY1] = 1
8
3 + 2s
(2 + s)2

a+
1
1 + s
Y1
2
;
E [2jY2; q1] = 1
4

1
2
3 + 2s
2 + s
a+
1 + 2s
2 (2 + s) (1 + s)
Y1 +
1
2 + s
Y2
2
;
and their ex ante prots are given by
1 =
1
8
3 + 2s
(2 + s)2
a2 +
1
8
3 + 2s
(s+ 1) (2 + s)2
2;
2 =
1
16
(3 + 2s)2
(2 + s)2
a2 +
1
16
8s2 + 20s+ 9
(s+ 1) (s+ 2)2
2:
When the demand is continuously distributed in an unbounded interval, the
leaders maximal equilibrium output quantity is achieved if and only if c = 0.
Then the leaders output quantity is linear in Y1 and the followers output quantity
is linear in Y1 and Y2. So if the demand is unboundedly distributed, our nding is
consistent with Gal-ors (1987) study. Since  is small relative to a, we compare
rmsex ante prots and nd that the follower always earns more ex ante prot
than the leader. This is also consistent with ndings in Gal-ors (1987) paper.
Corollary 2 If the demand is unbounded,
(1) rms follow linear decision rules, that is, rmsoutput quantities are linear
in the observed signals,
(2) the follower always earns more ex ante prot than the leader.
When the demand is unbounded, the Stackelberg leaders prot is lower than
that of the Stackelberg follower.Thus rms prefer to be the Stackelberg follower
rather than the Stackelberg leader.
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4.4 Bounded Demand
If the demand is boundedly distributed, the highest signal ~Y is nite. Then
c =   2
 1  1(a+ 11+s ~Y ) 1
is always smaller than 0. From equation (2), we nd that
the leader does not follow a linear decision rule.
Corollary 3 If the demand is boundedly distributed, the leaders output quantity
is not linear in its signal unless it observes the highest signal.
Lemma 2 Given the signals rms observe,
(1) q1 is decreasing in ~Y , while q

2 is increasing in ~Y ,
(2) E [1jY1] is decreasing in ~Y and E [2jY2; q1] is increasing in ~Y .
Proof. Please see the appendix.
Given the signal the leader observes, the higher the ~Y is, the lower its output
quantity and expected prot are. On the contrary, the follower is better o¤ with
a higher ~Y . If ~Y is small enough, the leader sets an output quantity which is
always larger than that of the followers. Thus, the leader can always earn more
prot than the follower. However, if ~Y is large enough, the follower may set a
higher output quantity than the leader and earn a high prot. Since its di¢ cult
to compare the two rmsex ante prots directly, we run numerical experiments
to make comparison. We consider beta-binomial distribution, specically, as-
sume that the demand A  Beta (; ) and the joint probability distribution of
(A; Y1; Y2) follows a beta-binomial distribution. The probability density function
(pdf) of A is
f(x) =
 (+ )
 () ()
x 1 (1  x) 1 ;
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with mean 
+
and variance 
(+)2(++1)
. The signal Yi, i 2 f1; 2g, follows
Binomial(1; A). The related probabilities and expectations are given by
Pr (Yi = kjA) = Ak (1  A)1 k , k = 0; 1:
E [YijA] = A;
V ar (YijA = x) = A (1  A) ;
E [Yi] =

+ 
;
E [V ar(YijA)] = 
(+ ) (+  + 1)
;
s =
E [V ar(YijA)]
V ar (A)
= + ;
E [AjYi] = 1
1 + s
Yi +
s
1 + s
E [A] ;
Pr (Y = k) =
  (+ k)   (   k + 1)
  (+  + 1)
  (+ )
  ()   ()
:
We assume that the mean of demand is 0.5, i.e., 
+
= 0:5. The highest signal
is xed and equal to 1. The rmsex ante prots are shown in Figure 1
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Figure 1: FirmsEx Ante Prot (E [A] = 0:5)
If the mean of demand is 0.1, i.e., 
+
= 0:1. ~Y = 1. The rmsex ante
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prots are shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: FirmsEx Ante Prot (E [A] = 0:1)
Observation 1 If the demand is boundedly distributed, the follower may
earn a higher ex ante prot than the leader.
From Figure 1, we can nd that the leaders prot is always higher than that
of the followers. However, when the mean of A is 0:1, from Figure 2, we nd
that when  is large enough, the leaders prot is always higher than that of
the followers. If  is smaller than 8, the follower may earn a higher prot than
the leader. So if the demand is distributed in a bounded interval, our nding is
di¤erent from Gal-ors (1987).
Knowing the follower will infer its private information from its output quan-
tity, to separate from other signal states, especially from the higher signal states,
the leader will set an output quantity which is lower than 1
2
(a+ E [jY1]). Hence,
the leader is worse o¤ by incurring the cost of signaling. On the contrary, the fol-
lower is better o¤. When the cost is large enough, the leader loses its rst-mover
advantage and the follower earns more ex ante prot than the leader.
We know that the leader is ex post e¢ cient if it observes the highest signal. If
the demand is distributed in a bounded interval, the highest signal can be achieved
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and the leader is ex post e¢ cient when it observes the highest signal. However,
if the demand is unbounded, the leader will never observe the highest signal, and
it will never be ex post e¢ cient. Recall that given a signal the leader observes,
its output quantity is decreasing with the highest signal. Given Y1, the leaders
equilibrium output quantity is decreasing in the ~Y (recall Lemma 2). If the
demand is unboundedly distributed, the highest signal is innite, thus the leader
incurs the largest cost of signaling compared with any other bounded demand
distribution. On the contrary, the followers output quantity is increasing with the
highest signal. Given signals rms observe, the follower sets the highest output
quantity if the demand distribution is unbound, hence it makes the maximal
prot. Thereby the leaders output quantity yields an equilibrium where the
follower earns more ex ante prot than the leader.
4.5 The Two E¤ects
We know that there are two e¤ects in the game, one is the e¤ect of the followers
more accurate information, and the other one is the e¤ect of cost of signaling. To
study these two e¤ects, we build two benchmark models. In model 1, we assume
that the two rms observe the same signal Y1 only. And in model 2, we assume
that rm 1 observes Y1 only, and rm 2 observes Y1 and Y2. The sequence of events
in these two benchmark models is same as the main model. Neither e¤ect plays
a role in model 1. The e¤ect of the followers more accurate information exists
in benchmark model 2, but nor does the e¤ect of cost of signaling. Comparing
the two benchmark models, we can nd the e¤ect of the followers more accurate
information. Comparing the benchmark model 2 with the main model, we can
study the e¤ect of cost of signaling.
4.5.1 Benchmark Model 1
Model 1 is similar to that of the base model except that at the beginning both
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rms observe same signal Y1 only. Solving the game, we get the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 If two rms observe same signal Y1 at the beginning, the unique equi-
librium is
 
qB1 ; q
B
2

, where
qB1 =
1
2
(a+ E [jY1]) ;
qB2 =
1
4
(a+ E [jY1]) :
Firms expected prots are
E

B1 jY1

=
1
8
(a+ E [jY1])2 ;
E

B2 jY1

=
1
16
(a+ E [jY1])2 ;
and their ex ante prots are
B1 =
1
8

a2 +
1
s+ 1
2

;
B2 =
1
16

a2 +
1
s+ 1
2

:
We can nd that if rms observe the same signal, the leaders equilibrium out-
put quantity is greater than that of the followers and the rst-mover advantage
still works.
4.5.2 Benchmark Model 2
In model 2, the leader observes signal Y1 only, and the follower observes both
Y1 and Y2. In this model, the follower possesses more accurate information than
the leader. Since the follower knows the leaders information, the leader does not
incur the cost to signal its information. So only the e¤ect of the followers more
accurate information exists in this model. Solving the game, we get the following
Lemma.
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Lemma 4 If the leaders information Y1 is public and the follower possesses
some private information Y2 about the uncertain demand, the Subgame Perfect
equilibrium for the game is
 
q^B1 ; q^
B
2

, where
q^B1 =
1
2
(a+ E [jY1]) ;
q^B2 =
1
2

1
2
a+ E [jY1; Y2]  1
2
E [jY1]

:
Firmsexpected prots are
E

^B1 jY1

=
1
8
(a+ E [jY1])2 ;
E

^B2 jY1; Y2

=
1
16
(a+ 2E [jY1; Y2]  E [jY1])2 ;
and their ex ante prots are
^B1 =
1
8
a2 +
1
8
1
s+ 1
2;
^B2 =
1
16
a2 +
1
16
1
s+ 1
2 +
1
4
s
s2 + 3s+ 2
2:
Since  is small relative to a, comparing rmsex ante prots, we nd that the
leaders ex ante prot is larger than that of the follower regardless of the demand
distribution. Although the follower possesses more accurate information than the
leader, the leader still earns more ex ante prot than the followers. With more
precise information, the followers knowledge about the demand is improved and
it can make decision wisely. However, the e¤ect of the followers more accurate
information doesnt make the follower better than the leader. Firms still prefer
the Stackelberg leadership.
From Corollary 1 and Lemma 4, we nd that the leaders equilibrium output
quantity q1 is no larger than q^
B
1 , this is because of the e¤ect of cost of signaling.
We dene the e¤ect of the followers more accurate information on the follower is
^B2   B2

, the e¤ect of cost of signaling on the leader is

^B1   1

, and the
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e¤ect of cost of signaling on the follower is

2   ^B2

.
If the demand is unboundedly distributed, the two e¤ects are shown in table
1.
Table 1 The two e¤ects
The followers more
accurate information
The leaders cost of signaling
The leader 0 1
8
 
s+1
s+2
2
a2 + 1
8
s+1
(s+2)2
2
The follower 1
4
s
s2+3s+2
2 1
16

3s2+8s+5
(s+2)2
a2 + 3s+5
(s+2)2
2

Proposition 2 If the demand is unboundedly distributed, the e¤ect of cost of
signaling on rms is larger than the e¤ect of followers more accurate information.
Comparing the two e¤ects shown in table 1, we can nd that the e¤ect of
cost of signaling is greater than that of the e¤ect of the followers more accurate
information.
If the demand is distributed in a bounded interval, we run a numerical simu-
lation to study the two e¤ects. We assume that the joint probability distribution
of (A; Y1; Y2) follows a beta-binomial distribution as in section 4.4 and the mean
of demand is 0.05. Figure 3 shows rmsex ante prots and the two e¤ects.
From Figure 3, we nd that under some condition, the e¤ect of the followers
more accurate information may be greater than that of cost of signaling. This is
di¤erent from the unbounded case.
When demand is unbounded, the leader incurs the largest cost to signal its
information to the follower, the follower benets most from the cost of signaling.
Hence, the e¤ect of cost of signaling is higher than that if the demand is bounded
and is also larger than that of followers more accurate information. As we know
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Figure 3: The Two E¤ects
the cost of signaling depends on the highest signal. If the highest signal is small
enough, the e¤ect of cost of signaling may be smaller than that of followers more
accurate information. However, if the highest signal is large enough, the e¤ect
of cost of signaling would be larger than that of the followers more accurate
information.
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5 THE IMPACT OF NUMBER OF DEMAND STATES FOR DIS-
CRETE DEMAND
We are also interested in that how the number of demand states a¤ects rms
decisions and prots if the demand is discrete. Discrete demand distribution is
also widely used in the literature, such as Anand and Goyal (2009), Kong et al.
(2013). In this section, we discuss how the number of demand states a¤ects the
e¤ect of cost of signaling. We discuss two cases, two demand states and three
demand states in this section.
5.1 Binary Case
5.1.1 Information Structure
The inverse demand function is given by
p = A  (q1 + q2) ,
The intercept A is random and can take one of the two values: a high value AH
with probability , where  2 (0; 1), and a low value AL (< AH) with probability
(1 ). These are common knowledge to all parties. Before making decision, the
two rms observe private signal Y1 and Y2 about the random intercept A, respec-
tively, where Y1, Y2 2 fAH ; ALg. Y1 and Y2 are independently generated from the
true A with probability , for  2  1
2
; 1

, i.e., Pr (Yi = Y ) = . We assume that
A is independent of events fY1 = Ag and fY2 = Ag, and fY1 = Ag is independent
of fY2 = Ag. Conditional on private signals, the leader and the follower will up-
date their probabilities of the demand states according to Bayesrule, specically,
Pr (A = AH jYi = AH) = +(1 )(1 ) , and Pr (A = ALjYi = AL) = (1 )(1 )+(1 ) .
The parameter  captures the accuracy of the signals. When  ! 1
2
, a sig-
nal provides no additional information since Pr(A = AH jYi = AH) =  and
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Pr(A = ALjYi = AL) = 1  . When  ! 1, the signals becomes perfect because
Pr(A = AH jYi = AH) = Pr(A = ALjYi = AL) = 1. The Bayesian updating is
shown in appendix and B1 to B8 are dened as follows,
B1 = E [AjY1 = AH ] ;
B2 = E [AjY1 = AL] ;
B3 = B6 Pr (Y2 = AH jY1 = AH) +B8 Pr (Y2 = ALjY1 = AH) ;
B4 = B5 Pr (Y2 = AH jY1 = AL) +B7 Pr (Y2 = ALjY1 = AL) ;
B5 = E [AjY1 = AH ; Y2 = AH ] ;
B6 = E [AjY1 = AL; Y2 = AH ] ;
B7 = E [AjY1 = AH ; Y2 = AL] ;
B8 = E [AjY1 = AL; Y2 = AL] :
5.1.2 Analysis
Following Anand and Goyal (2009), we assume there exists a q1L, if the follower
observes q1  q1L, it believes the leader observes a low signal. Otherwise, it
believes the signal is high. That is, the followers belief is
Pr2 (Y1 = AH) =
8><>: 0 if q1  q

1L;
1 otherwise.
(3)
In the second stage, the follower observes a demand information Y2 and the
leaders output quantity q1. The followers expected prot is given as follow,
E [2jY2; q1] = E [q2pjY2; w] ;
= q2 (E [AjY2; q1]  (q1 + q2)) :
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From the FOC,
q2 (q1; Y2) =
1
2
(E [Ajq1; Y2]  q1) : (4)
That is, if the follower observes a high signal (Y2 = AH) and the leader sets a
high output quantity, then the follower chooses q2HH as its output quantity. The
rst subscript 2 refers to rm 2, the second subscript means the type of the leader
in the followers belief, and the third subscript means that the followers demand
state. To be specic,
q2HH =
1
2
(B5   q1H) ;
q2LH =
1
2
(B6   q1L) ;
q2HL =
1
2
(B7   q1H) ;
q2LL =
1
2
(B8   q1L) :
In the rst stage, after the leader observes a signal Y1, it will decide an output
quantity q1. The leader may choose a q1 to reveal its type truthfully to the
follower. The leader may also choose a q1 which is di¤erent from its true type to
mislead the follower if it is protable to do so.
If the leader decides a q1 to reveal its information, when it observes a high
signal, it will choose q1H as its output quantity. Then the followers optimal
output quantity is q2 (q1H ; Y2). The leader believes that the expected demand and
the followers output quantity are E [AjY1 = AH ] and E [q2 (q1H ; Y2) jY1 = AH ],
respectively. The leaders expected prot is given by
E [1 (q1H jY1 = AH)] = q1H (E [AjY1 = AH ]  (q1H + E [q2 (q1H ; Y2) jY1 = AH ])) :
Similarly, when the leader observes a low signal, its expected prot is
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AL)] = q1L (E [AjY1 = AL]  (q1L + E [q2 (q1L; Y2) jY1 = AL])) :
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The leader may also choose an output quantity to mislead the follower. When
it observes a high signal, it chooses q1L as its output quantity rather than q1H
to misguide the follower. The leader believes that the expected demand and
the followers output quantity are E [AjY1 = AH ] and E [q2 (q1L; Y2) jY1 = AH ],
respectively. Hence, the leader maximizes
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AH)] = q1L (E [AjY1 = AH ]  (q1L + E [q2 (q1L; Y2) jY1 = AH ])) :
Similarly, when the leader observes a low signal, its expected prot is
E [1 (q1H jY1 = AL)] = q1H (E [AjY1 = AL]  (q1H + E [q2 (q1H ; Y2) jY1 = AL])) ;
where
E [q2 (q1H ; Y2) jY1 = AH ] =
1
2
B1   1
2
q1H ;
E [q2 (q1L; Y2) jY1 = AL] =
1
2
B2   1
2
q1L;
E [q2 (q1L; Y2) jY1 = AH ] =
1
2
B3   1
2
q1L;
E [q2 (q1H ; Y2) jY1 = AL] =
1
2
B4   1
2
q1H :
So we can simplify the above formulations to
E [1 (q1H jY1 = AH)] = q1H

1
2
B1   1
2
q1H

;
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AL)] = q1L

1
2
B2   1
2
q1L

;
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AH)] = q1L

B1   1
2
B3   1
2
q1L

;
E [1 (q1H jY1 = AL)] = q1H

B2   1
2
B4   1
2
q1H

:
For a pure strategy separating equilibrium to exist, q1H and q1L must emerge
as a simultaneous solution to the following constrained games: For high type
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leader, it solves the following problem,
max
q1H
E [1 (q1H jY1 = AH)] = q1H

1
2
B1   1
2
q1H

; (5)
subject to
E [1 (q1H jY1 = AL)]  E [1 (q1LjY1 = AL)]
q1H

B2   1
2
B4   1
2
q1H

 q1L

1
2
B2   1
2
q1L

; (6)
q1H  0: (7)
The problem for the low type leader is
max
q1L
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AL)] = q1L

1
2
B2   1
2
q1L

; (8)
subject to
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AH)]  E [1 (q1H jY1 = AH)]
q1L

B1   1
2
B3   1
2
q1L

 q1H

1
2
B1   1
2
q1H

; (9)
q1L  0: (10)
Inequalities (7) and (10) are the participation constraints that ensure rms
earn positive prots. And inequalities (6) and (9) are the incentive compatibility
constraints for a separating equilibrium to ensure each type of the leader prefers
not to mimic the other. The left hand side (LHS) are o¤-equilibrium prots and
the right hand side (RHS) are the equilibrium prots. The equilibrium prot is
no less than the o¤-equilibrium prot.
The above formulations satisfy: i) the leaders action (the optimal q1 derived
from (5) and (8)) is the best response to what it knows and its conjecture on
the followers belief, ii) the followers action (q2) is the best response to what it
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knows at that point (its own information and the leaders output quantity) and
its beliefs on the demand state given by (3), iii) the followers belief coincides
with the leaders conjecture on the followers belief. Hence, the three conditions
in subsection 4.2 are satised.
Since only the high type leader has incentives to mimic the low type, so the
high type leader sets q1H =
1
2
B1 to maximize its prot, and for the low type
leader, the game reduces to
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AL)] = q1L

1
2
B2   1
2
q1L

; (11)
subject to
q1L

B1   1
2
B3   1
2
q1L

 1
8
B21 : (12)
The Lagrangian for the above formulation is
$1(q1L; u) = max
q1L

q1L

1
2
B2   1
2
q1L

  u

q1L

B1   1
2
B3   1
2
q1L

  1
8
B21

;
The rst-order Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for the Lagrangian are:
(1a) :
@$1(q1L; u)
@q1L
 0)

1
2
B2   q1L

  u

B1   1
2
B3   q1L

+ 1 = 0;
(1b) : q1L
@$1(q1L; u)
@q1L
= 0 by complementary slackness,
(2a) :
@$1(q1L; u)
@u
 0)

q1L

B1   1
2
B3   1
2
q1L

  1
8
B21

+ 2 = 0;
(2b) : u
@$1(q1L; u)
@u
= 0 by complementary slackness.
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Solving the above problem we get, for u = 0,
q1L =
1
2
B2;
2  0)

q1L

B1   1
2
B3   1
2
q1L

  1
8
B21

 0;
AH
AL
2

2b1   2b3
b21 + b
2
2   4b1b2 + 2b2b3
+ 1;+1

, if
1
8
 
4b1b2   b21   b22   2b3b2

< 0;
where
b1 =

 + (1  ) (1  ) ;
b2 =
 (1  )
(1  )+  (1  ) ;
b3 =

 
 (1  ) (2   1)2 +  (1  )2
( + (1  ) (1  ))   (1  )2 + (1  ) 2 :
For u > 0, we have
q1L = B1  
1
2
B3  1
2
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3):
Call the lower root q(1)1L and the upper root q
(2)
1L :We know that the unconstrained
maximum of the equation (11) is at 1
2
B2, while the maximum for the LHS of the
constraint (12) is at
 
B1   12B3

, where
 
B1   12B3

> 1
2
B2. And we can nd
that q(1)1L <
1
2
B2 <
 
B1   12B3

< q
(2)
1L . If the constraint (12) binds at q

1L, then
any q1L 2 [12B2;
 
B1   12B3

] does not permit a separating equilibrium. Hence,
in order to separate out, the low type must decide an output lower than 1
2
B2 to
prevent the high type from mimicing him, so we abandon the upper root, i.e.,
q1L = B1   12B3   12
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3).
To guarantee above results are meaningful, we require that rmsoutput quan-
tity and the realized retail price is non-negative, i.e., the total output quantity is
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no greater than AL. In other words (please see appendix), if AHAL 2 
1,
q1L =
1
2
B2;
if AH
AL
2 
2,
q1L = B1  
1
2
B3   1
2
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3);
where

1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
AH
AL
:
AH
AL
2
264 2b1 2b3b21+b22 4b1b2+2b2b3+1;
1+
(+(1 )(1 ))(2+(1 )2(1 ))
(32+(1 2)(1 ))
375
if b21 + b
2
2   4b1b2 + 2b2b3 > 0
9>>>>=>>>>; ;

2 =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
AH
AL
:
AH
AL
2
0B@1;min
0B@ 1+ (+(1 )(1 ))(2+(1 )
2(1 ))
(32+(1 2)(1 )) ;
2b1 2b3
b21+b
2
2 4b1b2+2b2b3 + 1
1CA
1CA
if b21 + b
2
2   4b1b2 + 2b2b3 > 0;
AH
AL
2

1; 1+
(+(1 )(1 ))(2+(1 )2(1 ))
(32+(1 2)(1 ))

, otherwise.
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
:
We summarize the resultsin the following proposition.
Proposition 3 A separating equilibrium for the Stackelberg game with two de-
mand states exists and is as follows:
(1) The leaders equilibrium output quantity is
q1H =
1
2
B1 if Y1 = AH , and
q1L =
8><>:
1
2
B2 if Y1 = AL and AHAL 2 
1;
B1   12B3   12
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3) if Y1 = AL and AHAL 2 
2:
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(2) The followers equilibrium output quantity is
q2HH =
1
2

B5   1
2
B1

if Y2 = AH and Pr2 (Y1 = AH) = 1;
q2HL =
1
2

B7   1
2
B1

if Y2 = AL and Pr2 (Y1 = AH) = 1;
q2LH =
1
2

B6   1
2
B2

if Y2 = AH , Pr2 (Y1 = AH) = 0 and
AH
AL
2 
1;
q2LL =
1
2

B8   1
2
B2

if Y2 = AL, Pr2 (Y1 = AH) = 0 and
AH
AL
2 
1;
q2LH =
1
2

B6  B1 + 12B3 + 12
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3)

if Y2 = AH , Pr2 (Y1 = AH) = 0 and AHAL 2 
2;
q2LL =
1
2

B8  B1 + 12B3 + 12
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3)

if Y2 = AL, Pr2 (Y1 = AH) = 0 and AHAL 2 
2;
consistent with its belief that Pr2 (Y1 = AH) =
8><>: 0 if q1  q

1L;
1 otherwise.
(3) Firmsprots are as follows: the leader earns a expected prot of
E [1jY1 = AH ] = 1
8
B21 if Y1 = AH , and
E [1jY1 = AL] =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1
8
B22 if Y1 = AL and
AH
AL
2 
1;
B1   12B3   12
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3)


1
2
B2   12B1 + 14B3 + 14
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3)

if Y1 = AL and AHAL 2 
2:
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The followers expected prot is
E [2jY2 = AH ; q1H ] = 14
 
B5   12B1
2
if Y2 = AH
and Pr2 (Y1 = AH) = 1;
E [2jY2 = AL; q1H ] = 14
 
B7   12B1
2
if Y2 = AL
and Pr2 (Y1 = AH) = 1;
E [2jY2 = AH ; q1L] = 14
 
B6   12B2
2
if Y2 = AH ,
Pr2 (Y1 = AH) = 0 and AHAL 2 
1;
E [2jY2 = AL; q1L] = 14
 
B8   12B2
2
if Y2 = AL,
Pr2 (Y1 = AH) = 0 and AHAL 2 
1;
E [2jY2 = AH ; q1L] = 14

B6  B1 + 12B3 + 12
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3)
2
if
Y2 = AH , Pr2 (Y1 = AH) = 0 and AHAL 2 
2;
E [2jY2 = AL; q1L] = 14

B8  B1 + 12B3 + 12
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3)
2
if
Y2 = AL, Pr2 (Y1 = AH) = 0 and AHAL 2 
2:
Recall that in either demand state (high or low), the leader would like to
induce the follower to believe that its demand information is low, using the output
quantity as an instrument. When AH
AL
is high and in the set 
1, AH and AL are
so widely separated that the cost for the high type leader to mimic the low type
by setting a low output quantity is exorbitant. So a natural separation exists and
both the high type leader and the low type leader convey demand information
by setting their output quantities equal to 1
2
B1 and 12B2, respectively. However,
when AH
AL
is small and in set 
2, if the low type leader sets its output quantity
equal to 1
2
B2, the high type leader would prefer to mimic the low type by setting
q1 =
1
2
B2 rather than reveal its high type truthfully to the follower by setting
q1 =
1
2
B1. Hence, if the low type leader wants to send a low signal to the
follower, it need to set q1 smaller than 12B2 to make it costly for the high type
leader to mimic it. The high type leader wouldnt mimic the low type by setting
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its output quantity lower than B1   12B3   12
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3), since it is
not protable to do so. Hence, the optimal output quantity for the low type
leader is q1L = B1   12B3   12
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3) and the high type leader
sets q1H =
1
2
B1; as stated in Proposition 3. If AHAL 2 
2, the low type leader incurs
a cost to signal its private information. The cost of signaling makes the leader
worse o¤. However, the follower benets from the cost of signaling.
Firmsex ante prots are given as follows. If AH
AL
2 
1,
1 = E [1jY1 = AH ] Pr (Y1 = AH) + E [1jY1 = AL] Pr (Y1 = AL)
=
1
8
B21 Pr (Y1 = AH) +
1
8
B22 Pr (Y1 = AL) ;
2 = E [2jY1 = AH ; Y2 = AH ] Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
+E [2jY1 = AL; Y2 = AH ] Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AH)
+E [2jY1 = AH ; Y2 = AL] Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
+E [2jY1 = AL; Y2 = AL] Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AL)
=
1
4

B5   1
2
B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
+
1
4

B6   1
2
B2
2
Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AH)
+
1
4

B7   1
2
B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
+
1
4

B8   1
2
B2
2
Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AL) ;
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If AH
AL
2 
2,
1 =
1
8
B21 Pr (Y1 = AH) +D1

1
2
B2   1
2
D1

Pr (Y1 = AL) ;
2 =
1
4

B5   1
2
B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
+
1
4
(B6  D1)2 Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AH)
+
1
4

B7   1
2
B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
+
1
4
(B8  D1)2 Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AL) ;
where D1 = B1   12B3   12
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3).
Proposition 4 If the number of demand states is two, the leader always earns
more ex ante prot than the follower
Proof. Please see the appendix.
Though the leader incurs the cost of signaling and the follower possesses more
accurate information, the leader still earns more ex ante prot than the follower.
This seems to be di¤erent from the nding in section 4, in which the follower
may earn more prot than the leader under some conditions. Recall the Lemma
2 and Figure 1, if the highest signal is small enough, the cost of signaling is not
large enough, the leader still benets from the rst-mover advantage, and the
Stackelberg leadership is preferred by rms. In the discrete demand model, as
mentioned earlier, if AH
AL
2 
1, the high type leader has no incentive to mimic
the low type since it is too costly, a natural separation ensues and the leader
does not incur cost of signaling. If AH
AL
2 
2, the low type leader incurs a cost of
signaling, but it is not large enough to make the follower gain more prot than the
leader. We conjecture that the leaders cost of signaling depends on the number
of demand states. With more demand states, the lower type leader may incur a
higher cost of signaling. Hence, the follower benets more from it and may earn
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more prot than the leader. The next subsection will study the case when the
number of demand states is three.
5.2 Three-state Case
5.2.1 Information Structure
The inverse demand function is given by
p = A  (q1 + q2) .
The intercept A is random and can take one of the three values: a high value
AH with probability pH , a middle value AM with probability pM and a low
value AL with probability pL. We have 0 < AL < AM < AH , pH , pM , pL 2
(0; 1) and pH + pM + pL = 1. These are common knowledge to all parties.
Before Making decisions, the leader and the follower observe private demand
information Y1 and Y2 about the random intercept A, respectively, and Y1, Y2 2
fAH ; AM ; ALg. Y1 and Y2 are independently generated from the true A with
probability , and  2  1
2
; 1

, that is, Pr (Yi = A) = . We assume that A is
independent of event fY1 = Ag and fY2 = Ag, and fY1 = Ag is independent of
fY2 = Ag. Conditional on private signals, the leader and the follower will update
their probabilities of the states. The parameter  captures the informativeness
of the signals. When  ! 1
2
, a signal provides no additional information than
common knowledge: Pr (A = AH jYi = AH) = pH , Pr (A = AM jYi = AM) = pM
and Pr(A = ALjYi = AL) = pL. When  ! 1, the signals reveal the truth with
certainty: Pr (A = AH jYi = AH) = Pr (A = AM jYi = AM) = Pr(A = ALjYi =
AL) = 1.
5.2.2 Analysis
We analyze this game by backward induction. We assume there exists a q1H and
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a q1L, if the follower observes q1  q1H , it believes the demand information state
the leader observes is high and if the follower observes q1  q1L, it believes that
the leaders demand information is low. Otherwise, it believes it is middle, i.e.,
the followers belief is
Pr2 (Y1 = AH) = 1 if q1  q1H ,
Pr2 (Y1 = AL) = 1 if q1  q1L;
Pr2 (Y1 = AM) = 1 otherwise.
In the second stage, the follower observes the leaders output quantity q1, and
it will try to infer the leaders private information from q1 based on its belief.
The followers expected prot is,
E [2jY2; q1] = E [q2pjY2; q1] = E [q2 (A  (q1 + q2)) jY2; q1]
= q2 (E [AjY2; q1]  (q1 + q2)) ;
From the FOC,
q2 (q1; Y2) =
1
2
(E [Ajq1; Y2]  q1) :
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To be specic,
q2HH =
1
2
(E [Ajq1H ; Y2 = AH ]  q1H) ;
q2HM =
1
2
(E [Ajq1H ; Y2 = AM ]  q1H) ;
q2HL =
1
2
(E [Ajq1H ; Y2 = AL]  q1H) ;
q2MH =
1
2
(E [Ajq1M ; Y2 = AH ]  q1M) ;
q2MM =
1
2
(E [Ajq1M ; Y2 = AM ]  q1M) ;
q2ML =
1
2
(E [Ajq1M ; Y2 = AL]  q1M) ;
q2LH =
1
2
(E [Ajq1L; Y2 = AH ]  q1L) ;
q2LM =
1
2
(E [Ajq1L; Y2 = AM ]  q1L) ;
q2LL =
1
2
(E [Ajq1L; Y2 = AL]  q1L) :
The rst subscript 2 refers to the rm 2, and the second subscript (H, M or L)
means that the leaders output quantity is high, middle or low, and the third
subscript means that the follower observes a high, middle or low signal. When
the leader observes Y1, it will decide q1. The leader can decides q1 to reveal its
type truthfully to the follower or to mislead the follower. If the leader decides q1
to reveal its type truthfully,
E [1 (q1H jY1 = AH)] = q1H (E [AjY1 = AH ]  (q1H + E [q2 (q1H) jY1 = AH ])) ;
E [1 (q1M jY1 = AM)] = q1M (E [AjY1 = AM ]  (q1M + E [q2 (q1M) jY1 = AM ])) ;
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AL)] = q1L (E [AjY1 = AL]  (q1L + E [q2 (q1L) jY1 = AL])) :
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However, if the leader decides q1 to mislead the follower,
E [1 (q1M jY1 = AH)] = q1M (E [AjY1 = AH ]  (q1M + E [q2 (q1M) jY1 = AH ])) ;
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AH)] = q1L (E [AjY1 = AH ]  (q1L + E [q2 (q1L) jY1 = AH ])) ;
E [1 (q1H jY1 = AM)] = q1H (E [AjY1 = AM ]  (q1H + E [q2 (q1H) jY1 = AM ])) ;
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AM)] = q1L (E [AjY1 = AM ]  (q1L + E [q2 (q1L) jY1 = AM ])) ;
E [1 (q1H jY1 = AL)] = q1H (E [AjY1 = AL]  (q1H + E [q2 (q1H) jY1 = AL])) ;
E [1 (q1M jY1 = AL)] = q1M (E [AjY1 = AL]  (q1M + E [q2 (q1M) jY1 = AL])) ;
where
E [q2 (q1H) jYM = AH ] =
1
2
C1   1
2
q1H ;
E [q2 (q1M) jY1 = AM ] =
1
2
C2   1
2
q1M ;
E [q2 (q1L) jY1 = AL] =
1
2
C3   1
2
q1L;
E [q2 (q1M) jY1 = AH ] =
1
2
C4   1
2
q1M ;
E [q2 (q1L) jY1 = AH ] =
1
2
C5   1
2
q1L;
E [q2 (q1AH ) jY1 = AM ] =
1
2
C6   1
2
q1H ;
E [q2 (q1L) jY1 = AM ] =
1
2
C7   1
2
q1L;
E [q2 (q1H) jY1 = AL] =
1
2
C8   1
2
q1H ;
E [q2 (q1M) jY1 = AL] =
1
2
C9   1
2
q1M :
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C1 = E [AjY1 = AH ] ;
C2 = E [AjY1 = AM ] ;
C3 = E [AjY1 = AL] ;
C4 = E [Ajq1M ; Y2 = AH ] Pr (Y2 = AH jY1 = AH)
+E [Ajq1M ; Y2 = AM ] Pr (Y2 = AM jY1 = AH)
+E [Ajq1M ; Y2 = AL] Pr (Y2 = ALjY1 = AH) ;
C5 = E [Ajq1L; Y2 = AH ] Pr (Y2 = AH jY1 = AH)
+E [Ajq1L; Y2 = AM ] Pr (Y2 = AM jY1 = AH)
+E [Ajq1L; Y2 = AL] Pr (Y2 = ALjY1 = AH) ;
C6 = E [Ajq1H ; Y2 = AH ] Pr (Y2 = AH jY1 = AM)
+E [Ajq1H ; Y2 = AM ] Pr (Y2 = AM jY1 = AM)
+E [Ajq1H ; Y2 = AL] Pr (Y2 = ALjY1 = AM) ;
C7 = E [Ajq1L; Y2 = AH ] Pr (Y2 = AH jY1 = AM)
+E [Ajq1L; Y2 = AM ] Pr (Y2 = AM jY1 = AM)
+E [Ajq1L; Y2 = AL] Pr (Y2 = ALjY1 = AM) ;
C8 = E [Ajq1H ; Y2 = AH ] Pr (Y2 = AH jY1 = AL)
+E [Ajq1H ; Y2 = AM ] Pr (Y2 = AM jY1 = AL)
+E [Ajq1H ; Y2 = AL] Pr (Y2 = ALjY1 = AL) ;
C9 = E [Ajq1M ; Y2 = AH ] Pr (Y2 = AH jY1 = AL)
+E [Ajq1M ; Y2 = AM ] Pr (Y2 = AM jY1 = AL)
+E [Ajq1M ; Y2 = AL] Pr (Y2 = ALjY1 = AL) :
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Hence,
E [1 (q1H jY1 = AH)] = 1
2
(C1   q1H) q1H ;
E [1 (q1M jY1 = AM)] = 1
2
(C2   q1M) q1M ;
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AL)] = 1
2
(C3   q1L) q1L;
E [1 (q1M jY1 = AH)] = q1M

C1  

1
2
q1M +
1
2
C4

;
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AH)] = q1L

C1  

1
2
q1L +
1
2
C5

;
E [1 (q1H jY1 = AM)] = q1H

C2  

1
2
q1H +
1
2
C6

;
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AM)] = q1L

C2  

1
2
q1L +
1
2
C7

;
E [1 (q1H jY1 = AL)] = q1H

C3  

1
2
q1H +
1
2
C8

;
E [1 (q1M jY1 = AL)] = q1M

C3  

1
2
q1M +
1
2
C9

:
For a pure strategy separating equilibrium to exist, q1H , q1M and q1L must
emerge as a simultaneous solution to the following constrained game: the problem
for high type leader is
max
q1H
E [1 (q1H jY1 = AH)] = 1
2
(C1   q1H) q1H ; (13)
subject to
E [1 (q1H jY1 = AM)]  E [1 (q1M jY1 = AM)] ; (14)
E [1 (q1H jY1 = AL)]  E [1 (q1LjY1 = AL)] ; (15)
q1H  0: (16)
The problem for middle type leader is to maximize
max
q1M
E [1 (q1M jY1 = AM)] = 1
2
(C2   q1M) q1M ; (17)
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subject to
E [1 (q1M jY1 = AH)]  E [1 (q1H jY1 = AH)] ; (18)
E [1 (q1M jY1 = AL)]  E [1 (q1LjY1 = AL)] ; (19)
q1M  0: (20)
And the problem for low type leader is to maximize
max
q1L
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AL)] = 1
2
(C3   q1L) q1L; (21)
subject to
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AH)]  E [1 (q1H jY1 = AH)] ; (22)
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AM)]  E [1 (q1M jY1 = AM)] ; (23)
q1L  0: (24)
Inequalities (16), (20) and (24) are participation constraints. Inequalities
(14), (15), (18), (19), (22) and (23) are the incentive compatibility constraints
for a separating equilibrium. The right hand side of these inequalities are the
equilibrium prots which are greater than the LHS o¤-equilibrium prots. For
the high type leader, constraints (14) and (15) do not bind since only the high
type leader has an incentive to mimic the lower type. So for the high type leader,
the optimal output quantity is 1
2
C1.
For the middle type leader, constraint (19) does not bind for similar reason
as the high type leader. So we need to solve
max
q1M
E [1 (q1M jY1 = AM)] = 1
2
(C2   q1M) q1M ; (25)
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subject to
E [1 (q1M jY1 = AH)]  E [1 (q1H jY1 = AH)] ; (26)
q1M

C1  

1
2
q1M +
1
2
C4

 1
8
C21 ;
The Lagrangian for the above formulation is
$2 (q1M ; u1) =
1
2
(C2   q1M) q1M   u1

q1M

C1  

1
2
q1M +
1
2
C4

  1
8
C21

;
The rst order KKT conditions for the Lagrangian are:
(1a) :
@$2 (q1M ; u1)
@q1M
 0)
0B@  u1  q1M  C1    12 q1M + 12C4  18C21
+1
2
((C2   q1M)  q1M) + 3
1CA = 0;
(1b) : q1M
@$2 (q1M ; u1)
@q1M
= 0 by complementary slackness,
(2a) :
@$2 (q1M ; u1)
@u1
 0)

q1M

C1  

1
2
q1M +
1
2
C4

  1
8
C21

+ 4 = 0;
(2b) : u1
@$2 (q1M ; u1)
@u1
= 0 by complementary slackness.
Solving the above system, we get: for u1 = 0,
q1M =
1
2
C2;
2  0) 1
2
C2

C1  

1
4
C2 +
1
2
C4

 1
8
C21 :
For u1 > 0, we have
q1M = C1  
1
2
C4  1
2
p
(C1   C4) (3C1   C4):
The unconstrained maxima of the equation (25) is at 1
2
C2, while the maxima for
the LHS of the constraint (26) is at
 
C1   12C4

, where
 
C1   12C4

> 1
2
C2. Since
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C1  12C4  12
p
(C1   C4) (3C1   C4) < 12C2 < C1  12C4+ 12
p
(C1   C4) (3C1   C4).
If q1M >
1
2
C2 does not permit a separating equilibrium. Hence, in order to
separate out, the middle type leader must set an output quantity lower than
1
2
C2, to prevent the high type leader from mimicing him. So q1M = C1   12C4  
1
2
p
(C1   C4) (3C1   C4). For the low type leader,
max
q1L
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AL)] = 1
2
(C3   q1L) q1L; (27)
subject to
q1L

C1  

1
2
q1L +
1
2
C5

 1
8
C21 ; (28)
q1L

C2  

1
2
q1L +
1
2
C7

 1
2
(C2   q1M) q1M :
(1) If q1M =
1
2
C2, then constraint (28) does not bind. The game reduces to
max
q1L
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AL)] = 1
2
(C3   q1L) q1L;
subject to
q1L

C2  

1
2
q1L +
1
2
C7

 1
2
(C2   q1M) q1M :
The Lagrangian for the above formulation is
$3 (q1L; u2) =
1
2
(C3   q1L) q1L
 u2

q1L

C2  

1
2
q1L +
1
2
C7

  1
2
(C2   q1M) q1M

;
Using the rst-order KKT conditions, we get if u2 = 0,
q1L =
1
2
C3;
If
1
2
C3

C2  

1
4
C3 +
1
2
C7

 1
8
C22 :
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if u2 > 0,
q1L = C2  
1
2
C7   1
2
p
(C2   C7) (3C2   C7):
(2) If q1M = C1   12C4   12
p
(C1   C4) (3C1   C4), the game reduces to
max
q1L
E [1 (q1LjY1 = AL)] = 1
2
(C3   q1L) q1L;
subject to
q1L

C2  

1
2
q1L +
1
2
C7

 1
2
(C2   q1M) q1M :
The Lagrangian for the above formulation is
$4 (q1L; u3) =
1
2
(C3   q1L) q1L
 u3

q1L

C2  

1
2
q1L +
1
2
C7

  1
2
(C2   q1M) q1M

:
Using the rst-order KKT conditions to solve the Lagrangian function, we get if
u3 = 0,
q1L =
1
2
C3;
1
2
C3

C2  

1
4
C3 +
1
2
C7

 1
2
(C2  D2)D2;
and if u3 > 0,
q1L = C2  
1
2
C7   1
2
q
4D22   4D2C2 + 4C22   4C2C7 + C27 ;
where D2 = C1   12C4   12
p
(C1   C4) (3C1   C4):
Proposition 5 A separating equilibrium for the Stackelberg game with three de-
mand states exists and is as follows:
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(1) The leaders equilibrium output quantity is
q1H =
1
2
C1 if Y1 = AH , and
q1M =
8>>>><>>>>:
1
2
C2 if Y1 = AM and (AH ; AM ; AL) 2 
3;
C1   12C3   12
p
(C1   C3) (3C1   C3) if Y1 = AM
and (AH ; AM ; AL) 2 
4:
q1L =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
1
2
C3 if Y1 = AL and (AH ; AM ; AL) 2 
5 [ 
7;
C2   12C7   12
p
(C2   C7) (3C2   C7)if Y1 = AL
and (AH ; AM ; AL) 2 
6;
C2   12C7   12
p
4D22   4C2D2 + 4C22   4C2C7 + C27
if Y1 = AL and (AH ; AM ; AL) 2 
8:
where

3 =

(AH ; AM ; AL) : 4C2

C1  

1
4
C2 +
1
2
C4

 C21

;

4 =

(AH ; AM ; AL) : 4C2

C1  

1
4
C2 +
1
2
C4

> C21

;

5 =
8><>:(AH ; AM ; AL) : 4C2
 
C1  
 
1
4
C2 +
1
2
C4
  C21 ;
4C3
 
C2  
 
1
4
C3 +
1
2
C7
  C22
9>=>; ;

6 =
8><>:(AH ; AM ; AL) : 4C2
 
C1  
 
1
4
C2 +
1
2
C4
  C21 ;
4C3
 
C2  
 
1
4
C3 +
1
2
C7

> C22
9>=>; ;

7 =
8><>:(AH ; AM ; AL) : 4C2
 
C1  
 
1
4
C2 +
1
2
C4

> C21 ;
C3
 
C2  
 
1
4
C3 +
1
2
C7
  (C2  D2)D2
9>=>; ;

8 =
8><>:(AH ; AM ; AL) : 4C2
 
C1  
 
1
4
C2 +
1
2
C4

> C21 ;
C3
 
C2  
 
1
4
C3 +
1
2
C7

> (C2  D2)D2
9>=>; :
(2) The followers equilibrium output quantity is
q2 =
1
2
(E [AjY2; q1]  q1) ;
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consistent with its belief that
Pr2 (Y1 = AH) = 1 if q1  q1H ,
Pr2 (Y1 = AL) = 1 if q1  q1L;
Pr2 (Y1 = AM) = 1 otherwise.
(3) The rmsexpected prots are given by
E [1jY1] = 1
2
q1 (E [AjY1]  q1) ;
E [2jY2; q1] =
1
2
(E [AjY2; q1]  q1)2 :
Firmsprots are shown as follows,
If Y1 = AH ,
q1H =
1
2
C1;
E [1jY1 = AH ] = 1
8
C21 ;
E [2jY2 = AH ; q1H ] =
1
4

E [Ajq1H ; Y2 = AH ]  1
2
C1
2
;
E [2jY2 = AM ; q1H ] =
1
4

E [Ajq1H ; Y2 = AM ]  1
2
C2
2
;
E [2jY2 = AL; q1H ] =
1
4

E [Ajq1H ; Y2 = AL]  1
2
C3
2
;
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If Y1 = AM and (AH ; AM ; AL) 2 
3,
q1M =
1
2
C2;
E [1jY1 = AM ] = 1
8
C22 ;
E [2jY2 = AH ; q1M ] =
1
4

E [Ajq1M ; Y2 = AH ]  1
2
C2
2
;
E [2jY2 = AM ; q1M ] =
1
4

E [AjY2 = AM ; q1M ] 
1
2
C2
2
;
E [2jY2 = AL; q1M ] =
1
4

E [AjY2 = AL; q1M ] 
1
2
C2
2
:
If Y1 = AM and (AH ; AM ; AL) 2 
4,
q1M = C1  
1
2
C4   1
2
p
(C1   C4) (3C1   C4);
E [1jY1 = AM ] = 1
2
(C2  D2)D2;
E [2jY2 = AH ; q1M ] =
1
4
(E [Ajq1M ; Y2 = AH ] D2)2 ;
E [2jY2 = AM ; q1M ] =
1
4
(E [AjY2 = AM ; q1M ] D2)2 ;
E [2jY2 = AL; q1M ] =
1
4
(E [AjY2 = AL; q1M ] D2)2 :
If Y1 = AL and (AH ; AM ; AL) 2 
5,
q1L =
1
2
C3;
E [1jY1 = AL] = 1
8
C23 ;
E [2jY2 = AH ; q1L] =
1
4

E [AjY2 = AH ; q1L] 
1
2
C3
2
;
E [2jY2 = AM ; q1L] =
1
4

E [AjY2 = AM ; q1L] 
1
2
C3
2
;
E [2jY2 = AL; q1L] =
1
4

E [AjY2 = AL; q1L] 
1
2
C3
2
:
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If Y1 = AL and (AH ; AM ; AL) 2 
6,
q1L =

C2   1
2
C7   1
2
p
(C2   C7) (3C2   C7)

;
E [1jY1 = AL] =

1
2
(C3  D3)D3

;
E [2jY2 = AH ; q1L] =
1
4
(E [AjY2 = AH ; q1L] D3)2 ;
E [2jY2 = AM ; q1L] =
1
4
(E [AjY2 = AM ; q1L] D3)2 ;
E [2jY2 = AL; q1L] =
1
4
(E [AjY2 = AL; q1L] D3)2 ;
where D3 =

C2   12C7   12
p
(C2   C7) (3C2   C7)

:
If Y1 = AL and (AH ; AM ; AL) 2 
7,
q1L =
1
2
C3;
E [1jY1 = AL] = 1
8
C23 ;
E [2jY2 = AH ; q1L] =
1
4

E [AjY2 = AH ; q1L] 
1
2
C3
2
;
E [2jY2 = AM ; q1L] =
1
4

E [AjY2 = AM ; q1L] 
1
2
C3
2
;
E [2jY2 = AL; q1L] =
1
4

E [AjY2 = AL; q1L] 
1
2
C3
2
:
If Y1 = AL and (AH ; AM ; AL) 2 
8,
q1L = C2  
1
2
C7   1
2
q
4D22   4D2C2 + 4C22   4C2C7 + C27 ;
E [1 (q

1LjY1 = AL)] =
1
2
(C3   q1L) q1L;
E [2jY2 = AH ; q1L] =
1
4
(E [AjY2 = AH ; q1L]  q1L)2 ;
E [2jY2 = AM ; q1L] =
1
4
(E [AjY2 = AM ; q1L]  q1L)2 ;
E [2jY2 = AL; q1L] =
1
4
(E [AjY2 = AL; q1L]  q1L)2 :
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Firmsex ante prots are
1 = E [1jY1 = AH ] Pr (Y1 = AH) + E [1jY1 = AM ] Pr (Y1 = AM)
+E [1jY1 = AL] Pr (Y1 = AL) ;
2 = E [2jY2 = AH ; q1H ] Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
+E [2jY2 = AM ; q1H ] Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AM)
+E [2jY2 = AL; q1H ] Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
+E [2jY2 = AH ; q1M ] Pr (Y1 = AM ; Y2 = AH)
+E [2jY2 = AM ; q1M ] Pr (Y1 = AM ; Y2 = AM)
+E [2jY2 = AL; q1M ] Pr (Y1 = AM ; Y2 = AL)
+E [2jY2 = AH ; q1L] Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AH)
+E [2jY2 = AM ; q1L] Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AM)
+E [2jY2 = AL; q1L] Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AL) :
We analyze rmsex ante prots numerically below.
(1) If AH = 2, AM = 1:5, AL = 1, qH = 0:01, qM = 0:001, qL = 1  qH   qM ,
and  = 0:6, then q1H = 0:5100; q

1M = 0:4123 and q

1L = 0:3979, rmsex ante
prots are given by
1 = 0:1240;
2 = 0:0871:
The leader earns more prot than the follower.
(2) If AH = 2, AM = 1:5, AL = 1, qH = 0:1, qM = 0:01, qL = 1   qH   qM ,
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and  = 0:6. Then q1H = 0:5738, q

1M = 0:2609, and q

1L = 0:2453,
1 = 0:1038;
2 = 0:1251:
Hence, the follower earns more prot than the leader.
Observation 2 If the number of demand states is three, the follower may
earn more ex ante prot than the leader.
These results supports our earlier conjecture in section 5.1 that the cost of
signaling depends on the number of demand states. In binary case, the leader
always earns more prot than the follower. However, If the number of demand
states is three, for the middle type leader, it will decides an output quantity to
prevent the high type leader from mimicing it, and for the low type leader. It
will choose an output quantity to prevent both the high type and the middle
type leader from imitating, thus the low type leader incurs a higher cost to signal
its information. Therefore, the follower may earn more prot than the leader.
With more number of demand states, the leader will set a lower output quantity
to separate from higher states, thus the leader incurs a higher cost of signaling
when it observes a lower signal. The follower benets from the cost of signaling.
If there are innite number of demand states in interval [AL; AM ], we can regards
that the demand is continuously distributed in this interval to some extent, which
has been discussed in section 4.
5.2.3 The Two E¤ects
To explore the two e¤ects, we solve the two benchmark models in section 4.5.
Solving the two models, we get the following two Lemmas.
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Lemma 5 If both rms observe Y1 only, the equilibrium for the game is
qB1 =
1
2
E [AjY1] ;
qB2 =
1
4
E [AjY1] :
Firmsexpected prots are
E [1jY1] = 1
8
(E [AjY1])2 ;
E [2jY1] = 1
16
(E [AjY1])2 :
Lemma 6 If the leaders information Y1 is public and the follower possesses
some private information Y2 about the uncertain demand, the Subgame Perfect
equilibrium for the game is
 
q^B1 ; q^
B
2

, where
q^B1 =
1
2
E [AjY1] ;
q^B2 =
1
2

E [AjY1; Y2]  1
2
E [AjY1]

:
(1) Firmsexpected prot are
E

^B1 jY1

=
1
8
(E [AjY1])2 ;
E

^B2 jY1; Y2

=
1
4

E [AjY1; Y2]  1
2
E [AjY1]
2
:
53
(2) Firmsex ante prots are
^B1 = E [1jY1 = AH ] Pr (Y1 = AH) + E [1jY1 = AM ] Pr (Y1 = AM)
+E [1jY1 = AL] Pr (Y1 = AL) ;
^B2 = E [2jY1 = AH ; Y2 = AH ] Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
+E [2jY1 = AH ; Y2 = AM ] Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AM)
+E [2jY1 = AH ; Y2 = AL] Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
+E [2jY1 = AM ; Y2 = AH ] Pr (Y1 = AM ; Y2 = AH)
+E [2jY1 = AM ; Y2 = AM ] Pr (Y1 = AM ; Y2 = AM)
+E [2jY1 = AM ; Y2 = AL] Pr (Y1 = AM ; Y2 = AL)
+E [2jY1 = AL; Y2 = AH ] Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AH)
+E [2jY1 = AL; Y2 = AM ] Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AM)
+E [2jY1 = AL; Y2 = AL] Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AL) :
Lemma 7 If the number of demand states is three, though the follower possesses
more accurate information, the leaders output quantity is no less than that of the
followers, thus makes more ex ante prot.
Proof. Please see the appendix.
Comparing the two rmsex ante prots, we nd that ^B1 > ^
B
2 . The result
is consistent with that in section 4, the leader always gains more prot than the
follower when the leaders information is public. As in section 4.5,the e¤ect of
the followers more accurate information on the follower is

^B2   B2

, and the
e¤ect of cost of signaling on the follower is

2   ^B2

. Based on Lemma 5 and
Lemma 6, we can compute the e¤ect of cost of signaling.
We numerically compare the e¤ect of cost of signaling on the leader if the
number of demand states is two and three. The mean in two cases is the same.
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(1) If the number of demand states is two, AH = 1:5, AL = 1,  = 0:105,
 = 0:6, then
Table 2: The two e¤ects (Two demand states)
The e¤ect of the followers
more accurate information
The e¤ect of
cost of signaling
The leader 0 0.0033
The follower -0.0027 0.0638
(2) If the number of demand states is three, AH = 1:5, AM = 1:25, AL = 1,
pH = 0:1, pM = 0:01, pL = 0:89,  = 0:6, then
Table 3: The two e¤ects (Three demand states)
The e¤ect of followers
more accurate information
The e¤ect of
cost of signaling
The leader 0 0.0236
The follower -0.00012 0.0558
Observation 3 The e¤ect of cost of signaling on leader may increase with
more number of demand states.
From table 2 and table 3, we nd that the e¤ect of cost of signaling on the
leader increases from 0.0033 to 0.0236. We can nd same observation if we change
the parameters value.
If the demand is discretely distributed, the highest type leader takes ex post
e¢ cient action. However, other type leader may incur a cost to signal its informa-
tion. If the number of demand states is two, only the low type leader may incur
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the cost to separate from the high type leader. However, if the number of demand
states is three, both the middle type leader and the low type leader may incur
the cost of signaling. For the middle type leader, it will set an output quantity
to prevent the high type leader from mimicing it. For the low type leader, it will
set an output quantity to prevent both the middle type and the high type leader
from mimicing it, thus may incur a higher cost to separate from them. Hence,
the e¤ect of cost of signaling becomes more signicant with more demand states.
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6 CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we consider a sequential-move game in which two rms are engaged
in a Cournot competition and sell homogeneous product to customers. Firms
are faced with uncertain demand, and each possesses some private information
about the uncertain demand. The leader decides its output quantity rst. Upon
observing the leaders output quantity, the follower will try to infer leaders private
information from the observable action, i.e., its output quantity, and update
its belief about the uncertain demand based on the inferred information and
its private information, thus the follower makes decision based on more precise
information than the leader. Knowing the followers rational inference, the leader
chooses an output quantity by taking the followers reaction into account. That
is, there is a signaling game between the leader and the follower. Signaling is
costly, so the leader incurs a cost of signaling, which hurts the leader. There are
two e¤ects in this game. One is that the e¤ect caused by the followers more
accurate information. The other one is the e¤ect of the leaders cost of signaling.
The follower benets from the two e¤ects and then may earn more prots than
the leader.
This thesis answers the question of how rms private information a¤ects
rmsdecisions, prots and their preference for the Stackelberg leadership. We
assume the demand is linear and uncertain. The uncertain demand can be con-
tinuously distributed or discretely distributed. Both the continuous demand and
the discrete demand are widely used in the literature.
When the demand is continuously distributed in an unbounded interval, rms
follow linear decision rules and the follower always earns more ex ante prot than
the leader. This is consistent with Gal-ors (1987) nding. However, when the
demand is continuously distributed in a bounded interval, Gal-ors nding does
not hold. Firmsoutput quantities are not linear in the signals and the leader
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may earn more ex ante prot than the follower. Without cost of signaling, though
the follower has more precise information than the leader, the leader still earns
more ex ante prot than the follower regardless of the distribution of demand.
Comparing the two e¤ects, we nd that the e¤ect of cost of signaling plays an
important role in reversing rmspreference for the Stackelberg leadership.
We also study how the number of demand states a¤ects the Stackelberg
leaders cost of signaling when the demand follows a discrete distribution. We
nd that the cost of signaling depends on the number of demand states. With
more demand states, the leader will set a lower output quantity to separate from
other states and, thus incur a higher cost of signaling.
There are some potential issues that deserve further research. In my thesis,
we assume that rms have same precision about the uncertain demand. It would
be interesting to extend our framework to address how the signal precision a¤ects
rmsdecisions, prots and their preference for the Stackelberg leadership.
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Appendix
Proof of Corollary 1. When her observes a signal Y1, taking the rst derivative
of LHS of (2) over q1, we get
dLHS
dq1
=
2
  1  
2
  1 

a+ 1
1+s
~Y
 1 (q1) 1
=
2
  1  
2
  1 
0@ q1
1
2

a+ 1
1+s
~Y

1A 1
=
2
  1
0B@1 
0@ q1
1
2

a+ 1
1+s
~Y

1A 1
1CA :
Since q1  12

a+ E
h
j ~Y
i
, thus,
dLHS
dq1
 2
  1 (1  1) = 0:
So, LHS is increasing with q1. We substitute q1 with
1
2
(a+ E [jY1]) into the
LHS,
LHS =
1
2
2
  1 (a+ E [jY1]) 
2
  1
1
a+ 1
1+s
~Y
 1 12 (a+ E [jY1])

=

  1 (a+ E [jY1]) 
1
  1
(a+ E [jY1]) 1
a+ 1
1+s
~Y
 1 (a+ E [jY1])
=
1
  1 (a+ E [jY1])
0B@  (a+ E [jY1]) 1
a+ 1
1+s
~Y
 1
1CA
=
1
  1 (a+ E [jY1])
0B@ 
0@ a+ E [jY1]
a+ E
h
j ~Y
i
1A 1
1CA ;
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since E [jY1]  E
h
j ~Y
i
,

a+E[jY1]
a+E[j ~Y ]

 1
1
  1 (a+ E [jY1])
0B@ 
0@ a+ E [jY1]
a+ E
h
j ~Y
i
1A 1
1CA
 1
  1 (a+ E [jY1]) (  1)
= (a+ E [jY1])
= RHS:
Since LHS is increasing with q1, so q

1  12 (a+ E [jY1]) and only when Y1 = ~Y ,
q1 =
1
2

a+ E
h
j ~Y
i
.
Proof of Lemma 2. Given the signals rms observe,
(1) q1 is decreasing with ~Y , while q

2 is increasing with ~Y ,
(2) E [1jY1] is decreasing with ~Y and E [2jY2; q1] is increasing with ~Y .
(1)
2
  1  q

1  
2
  1 
1
a+ 1
1+s
~Y
 1  (q1) = a+ 11 + sY1
2
  1  q

1  
2
  1 
1
a+ 1
1+s
~Y
 1  (q1)   a  11 + sY1 = 0
2
  1 
1
a+ 1
1+s
~Y
 1  (q1) = 2  1  q1   a  11 + sY1
a+
1
1 + s
~Y
 1
=
1
 1
2(q1)

 
2
 1  q1   a  11+sY1


a+
1
1 + s
~Y
 1
=
2 (q1)

(  1)   2
 1  q1   a  11+sY1


a+
1
1 + s
~Y

=
 
2 (q1)

(  1)   2
 1  q1   a  11+sY1
! 1 1
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~Y = (1 + s)
 
2 (q1)

(  1)   2
 1  q1   a  11+sY1
! 1 1   (1 + s) a:
Taking the rst derivative of ~Y over q1, we get
d
dq1
0@(1 + s) 2 (q1)
(  1)   2
 1  q1   a  11+sY1
! 1 1   (1 + s) a
1A
= (1 + s)
0BB@ 1 1

2(q1)

( 1)( 2 1 q1 a  11+sY1)
 2 
 1


2( 1)(q1)
 1
(2p1 a  11+sY1)
(( 1)( 2 1 q1 a  11+sY1))
2

1CCA :
Since  2 (1; 2) and q1  12 (a+ E [jY1]) ; so
d ~Y
dp1
 0, only when Y1 = ~Y , d
~Y
dp1
= 0:
So ~Y is decreasing with q1 , q1 is decreasing with ~Y .
q2 =
1
2
0B@a  q1 +
0B@ 2
  1q

1  
1

2
  1
1
a+ 1
1+s
~Y
 1 (q1) + 12 + sY2
1CA
1CA
dq2
d ~Y
=
1
2
8>><>>:
  d
d ~Y
q1 +
2
 1  dd ~Y q1
  1

2
 1 
 
(q1)
 d
d ~Y

1
(a+ 11+s ~Y )
 1

+

q1
a+ 1
1+s
~Y
 1
  d
d ~Y
q1
!
9>>=>>;
=
1
2
8>>><>>>:
 
 1 + 2
 1   2

 1 

q1
a+ 1
1+s
~Y
 1!
d
d ~Y
q1
  1

2
 1  (q1) dd ~Y

1
(a+ 11+s ~Y )
 1

9>>>=>>>; :
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dd ~Y
0B@ 1
a+ 1
1+s
~Y
 1
1CA =   (  1)2a+ 1
1 + s
~Y
 
< 0 ;
So
0@ 1 + 2
  1  
2
  1 
 
q1
a+ 1
1+s
~Y
! 11A < 0 ;
Hence
dq2
d ~Y
> 0 :
q2 in increasing with ~Y .
Proof. (2)
E [1jY1] = 1
2
q1

a  q1 +
1
1 + s
Y1

;
d
dq1
(E [1jY1]) = 1
2

a  q1 +
1
1 + s
Y1

  1
2
q1
=
1
2
a  q1 +
1
2
1
1 + s
Y1
 0:
E [2jY2; q1] =
1
4

a+
1
2 + s
Y1 +
1
2 + s
Y2   q1
2
;
d
dp1
(E [2jY2; q1]) =
1
2

q1  

a+
1
2 + s
Y1 +
1
2 + s
Y2

=
1
2
(q1   (a+ E [jY1; Y2]))
 1
2

1
2

a+
1
1 + s
Y1

  (a+ E [jY1; Y2])

=
1
2

 1
2
a  1
2
s
(1 + s) (2 + s)
Y1   1
2 + s
Y2

 1
2

 1
2
a+
1
2
s
(1 + s) (2 + s)
a+
1
2 + s
a

=  1
4
s2
(1 + s) (2 + s)
a
< 0:
To sum up, E [1jY1] is increasing with q1, and E [2jY2; q1] is decreasing with q1,
while q1 is decreasing with ~Y , so E [1jY1] is decreasing with ~Y and E [2jY2; q1]
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is increasing with ~Y :
Proof of Lemma 4. We analyze the benchmark model by backward induction.
In the second stage, the follower uses information available to it to maximize
its expected prot
E

B2 jY1; Y2

= qB2
 
a+ E [jY1; Y2] 
 
qB1 + q
B
2

;
where the script B means the benchmark model. From the FOC, we get
qB2 =
a+ E [jY1; Y2]  qB1
2
:
In the rst stage, the leader decides the output quantity
E

B2 jY1

= qB1
 
a+ E [jY1] 
 
qB1 + E

qB2 jY1

= qB1

1
2
a+
1
2
E [jY1]  1
2
qB1

:
From the FOC, we get
qB1 =
1
2
(a+ E [jY1]) ;
Thus, the followers equilibrium output quantity is
qB2 =
1
2

1
2
a+ E [jY1; Y2]  1
2
E [jY1]

:
Firmsexpected prots are given by
E

B1 jY1

=
1
8

a+
1
1 + s
Y1
2
;
E

B2 jY1; Y2

=
1
16

a+
2
2 + s
(Y1 + Y2)  1
1 + s
Y1
2
:
Taking expectation of E

B1 jY1

and E

B2 jY1; Y2

with respect to signal, we get
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rmsex ante prots,
B1 =
1
8
a2 +
1
8
2
s+ 1
;
B2 =
1
16
a2 +
1
16
2
s+ 1
+
1
4
s
s2 + 3s+ 2
2:
We compare rmsex ante prots
B1   B2 =
1
16
a2   1
16
3s  2
s2 + 3s+ 2
2:
Since  is small relative to a,
B1   B2 >
1
16
a2
s2 + 4
s2 + 3s+ 2
> 0:
Therefore, the leader always more prot than that of the followers.
Bayesian Updating for Binary Case. Pr (Yi = AH)= +(1  ) (1  ) :
Pr (Y i= AL) =  (1  )+ (1  ) :
Pr (Y1 = H; Y2 = H)= 
2+(1  )2 (1  ) :
Pr (Y1 = H; Y2 = L)=  (1  ) :
Pr (Y1 = L; Y2 = H)=  (1  ) :
Pr (Y1 = L; Y2 = L)= (1  )2 + 2 (1  ) :
Pr (Y = AH jY i= AH) = +(1 )(1 ) :
Pr (Y = ALjY i= AH) = (1 )(1 )+(1 )(1 ) :
Pr (Y = AH jY i= AL) = (1 )(1 )+(1 ) :
Pr (Y = ALjY i= AL) = (1 )(1 )+(1 ) :
Pr (Yi = AH jYj = AH)=2+(1 )
2(1 )
+(1 )(1 ) :
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Pr (Yi = ALjYj = AH)= (1 )+(1 )(1 ) :
Pr (Yi = ALjYj = AL)= (1 )
2+2(1 )
(1 )+(1 ) :
Pr (Yi = AH jYj = AL)= (1 )(1 )+(1 ) :
Pr (AH jYi = AH ; Yj = AH)= 22+(1 )2(1 ) :
Pr (ALjYi = AH ; Yj = AH)= (1 )
2(1 )
2+(1 )2(1 ) :
Pr (AH jYi = AH ; Yj = AL)= :
Pr (ALjYi = AH ; Yj = AL)= (1  ) :
Pr (AH jYi = AL; Yj = AL)= (1 )
2
(1 )2+2(1 ) :
Pr (ALjYi = AL; Yj = AL)= 2(1 )(1 )2+2(1 ) :
Requirement for Binary Case. We should require that rmsoutput quan-
tities and the realized retail price are non-negative, that is
q1  0;
q2  0;
q1 + q2  AL:
1. If u = 0,

q1L

B1   1
2
B3   1
2
q1L

  1
8
B21

 0
) AH
AL
2

2b1   2b3
b21 + b
2
2   4b1b2 + 2b2b3
+ 1;+1

,
if

1
2
b1b2   1
8
b21  
1
8
b22  
1
4
b3b2

< 0 :
Its easy to verify that q1  0. We know that B5 > B1 > B6 = B7 > B2 >
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B8. We should guarantee that
q2HH =
1
2

B5   1
2
B1

 0;
q2LH =
1
2

B6   1
2
B2

 0;
q2HL =
1
2

B7   1
2
B1

 0;
q2LL =
1
2

B8   1
2
B2

 0:
q2HH and q

2LH is obviously larger than 0.

1
2

B7   1
2
B1

 0

)
8>>>><>>>>:
AH
AL
> 1 if (2 + 2 (1  ) (1  )  )  0;
AH
AL
 ( 1)(2+(1 2)(1 ))
(2+2(1 )(1 ) )
if 2 + 2 (1  ) (1  )   < 0
:
9>>>>=>>>>;
1
2

B8   1
2
B2

 0

)
8>>>><>>>>:
AH
AL
> 1 if + 2   32   4 + 42  0;
AH
AL
 ( 
2 4+42)
(1 )(+2 32 4+42)
if + 2   32   4 + 42 < 0
9>>>>=>>>>;
q1H + q

2HH =
1
4
B1 +
1
2
B5  AL;
q1H + q

2HL =
1
4
B1 +
1
2
B7  AL;
q1L + q

2LH =
1
4
B2 +
1
2
B6  AL;
q1L + q

2LL =
1
4
B2 +
1
2
B8  AL:
Since B5 > B6 = B7 > B8 and , so if 14B1 +
1
2
B5  AL and 14B2 + 12B6  AL,
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then 1
4
B1 +
1
2
B7  AL and 14B2 + 12B8  AL:
1
4
B1 +
1
2
B5  AL ) AH
AL
<1+
( + (1  ) (1  ))  2+ (1  )2 (1  )
 (32+ (1  2) (1  )) ;
1
4
B2 +
1
2
B6  AL ) AH
AL
<1+
((1  )+  (1  ))
 (1  ) + 2 ((1  )+  (1  )) :
To sum up,
AH
AL
2
264 2b1 2b3b21+b22 4b1b2+2b2b3 + 1;
1 +
(+(1 )(1 ))(2+(1 )2(1 ))
(32+(1 2)(1 ))
375
if b21 + b
2
2   4b1b2 + 2b2b3 > 0:

1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
AH
AL
:
AH
AL
2
264 2b1 2b3b21+b22 4b1b2+2b2b3+1;
1+
(+(1 )(1 ))(2+(1 )2(1 ))
(32+(1 2)(1 ))
375
if b21 + b
2
2   4b1b2 + 2b2b3 > 0
9>>>>=>>>>; ;

2 =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
AH
AL
:
AH
AL
2
0B@1;min
0B@ 1+ (+(1 )(1 ))(2+(1 )
2(1 ))
(32+(1 2)(1 )) ;
2b1 2b3
b21+b
2
2 4b1b2+2b2b3 + 1
1CA
1CA
if b21 + b
2
2   4b1b2 + 2b2b3 > 0;
AH
AL
2

1; 1+
(+(1 )(1 ))(2+(1 )2(1 ))
(32+(1 2)(1 ))

, otherwise.
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
:
2. If u > 0, its easy to verify that q1  0. we should guarantee that
q2HH =
1
2

B5   1
2
B1

 0;
q2HL =
1
2

B7   1
2
B1

 0;
q2LH =
1
2

B6  B1 + 1
2
B3 +
1
2
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3)

 0;
q2LL =
1
2

B8  B1 + 1
2
B3 +
1
2
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3)

 0:
Its easy to verify that q2HH > 0 and q

2LH > 0.
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
1
2

B7   1
2
B1

 0

)
8>>>><>>>>:
AH
AL
> 1 if (2 + 2 (1  ) (1  )  )  0;
AH
AL
 ( 1)(2+(1 2)(1 ))
(2+2(1 )(1 ) )
if 2 + 2 (1  ) (1  )   < 0
:
9>>>>=>>>>;
Since B1 + 12B3 +
1
2
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3) < 12B2, so when8>>>><>>>>:
AH
AL
> 1 if + 2   32   4 + 42  0;
AH
AL
 ( 
2 4+42)
(1 )(+2 32 4+42)
if + 2   32   4 + 42 < 0
9>>>>=>>>>;
) 1
2

B8  B1 + 1
2
B3 +
1
2
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3)

> 0:
q1H + q

2HH =
1
4
B1 +
1
2
B5  AL;
q1H + q

2HL =
1
4
B1 +
1
2
B7  AL;
q1L + q

2LH =
8><>:

B1   12B3   12
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3)

+1
2

B6  B1 + 12B3 + 12
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3)

9>=>;  AL;
q1L + q

2LL =
8><>:

B1   12B3   12
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3)

+1
2

B8  B1 + 12B3 + 12
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3)

9>=>;  AL:
We only need to q1H + q

2HH  AL and q1L + q2LH  AL.
q1H + q

2HH  AL )
AH
AL
 1+(2      + 1)
 
2+ (1  )2 (1  )
 (32+ (1  2) (1  )) ;
q1L + q

2LH  AL )
AH
AL
 1+3b1   2b3 + 2+ 2
p
(b1   b3) (2b1   b3 + )
8b1   4b3 + b21 + 42
:
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To sum up,
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
AH
AL
:
AH
AL
2
0B@1;min
0B@ 1+ (+(1 )(1 ))(2+(1 )
2(1 ))
(32+(1 2)(1 )) ;
2b1 2b3
b21+b
2
2 4b1b2+2b2b3 + 1
1CA
1CA
if b21 + b
2
2   4b1b2 + 2b2b3 > 0;
AH
AL
2

1; 1+
(+(1 )(1 ))(2+(1 )2(1 ))
(32+(1 2)(1 ))

, otherwise.
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
:
B1 to B8 are shown as follows,
B1 = AH

 + (1  ) (1  ) + AL
(1  ) (1  )
 + (1  ) (1  ) ; (29)
B2 = AH
 (1  )
(1  )+  (1  ) + AL
 (1  )
(1  )+  (1  ) ;
B3 =
8>><>>:
AH

((1 )+(1 )(1 )(1 4)+(1 )2)
(+(1 )(1 ))((1 )2+(1 )2)

+AL

(1 )((1 )(1 )+(42(1 ) 3(1 )+2(1 )))
((1 )2+2(1 ))(+(1 )(1 ))

9>>=>>; ;
B4 =
8>><>>:
AH

((1 )(1 )+(42(1 ) 3(1 )+2(1 )))
(2+(1 )2(1 ))((1 )+(1 ))

+AL

(1 )((1 )+((1 ) 4(1 )+(1 ))(1 ))
(2+(1 )2(1 ))((1 )+(1 ))

9>>=>>; ;
B5 = AH
2
2+ (1  )2 (1  ) + AL
(1  )2 (1  )
2+ (1  )2 (1  ) ; (30)
B6 = AH+ AL (1  ) ;
B7 = AH+ AL (1  ) ; (31)
B8 = AH
(1  )2 
(1  )2 + 2 (1  ) + AL
2 (1  )
(1  )2 + 2 (1  ) :
Proof of Proposition 4. The rms ex ante payo¤s are as follows,
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If AH
AL
2 
1,
1 = E [1jY1 = AH ] Pr (Y1 = AH) + E [1jY1 = AL] Pr (Y1 = AL)
=
1
8
B21 Pr (Y1 = AH) +
1
8
B22 Pr (Y1 = AL) ;
2 = E [2jY1 = AH ; Y2 = AH ] Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
+E [2jY1 = AL; Y2 = AH ] Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AH)
+E [2jY1 = AH ; Y2 = AL] Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
+E [2jY1 = AL; Y2 = AL] Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AL)
=
1
4

B5   1
2
B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
+
1
4

B6   1
2
B2
2
Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AH)
+
1
4

B7   1
2
B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
+
1
4

B8   1
2
B2
2
Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AL) :
If AH
AL
2 
2,
1 = E [1jY1 = AH ] Pr (Y1 = AH) + E [1jY1 = AL] Pr (Y1 = AL)
=
1
8
B21 Pr (Y1 = AH) +D1

1
2
B2   1
2
D1

Pr (Y1 = AL) ;
2 = E [2jY1 = AH ; Y2 = AH ] Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
+E [2jY1 = AL; Y2 = AH ] Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AH)
+E [2jY1 = AH ; Y2 = AL] Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
+E [2jY1 = AL; Y2 = AL] Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AL)
=
1
4

B5   1
2
B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
+
1
4
(B6  D1)2 Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AH)
+
1
4

B7   1
2
B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
+
1
4
(B8  D1)2 Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AL) ;
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where D1 =

B1   12B3   12
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3)

:
We will prove following inequality, when AH
AL
2 
1,
1a) :
1
8
B21 Pr (Y1 = AH) 
8><>:
1
4
 
B5   12B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
+1
4
 
B6   12B2
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
9>=>; ;
1b) :
1
8
B22 Pr (Y1 = AL) 
8><>:
1
4
 
B7   12B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AH)
+1
4
 
B8   12B2
2
Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AL)
9>=>; ;
When AH
AL
2 
2,
2a) :
1
8
B21 Pr (Y1 = AH) 
8><>:
1
4
 
B5   12B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
+1
4
(B6  D1)2 Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
9>=>; ;
2b) : D1

1
2
B2   1
2
D1

Pr (Y1 = AL)  1
4

B7   1
2
B1
2
Pr (Y1=AL; Y2=AH)
+
1
4
(B8  D1)2 Pr (Y1=AL; Y2=AL) ;
1a)
1
8
B21 Pr (Y1 = AH)

8><>:
1
4
 
B5   12B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
+1
4
 
B6   12B2
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
9>=>; :
From 2a), we know that
1
8
B21 Pr (Y1 = AH)
>
8><>:
1
4
 
B5   12B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
+1
4
(B6  D1)2 Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
9>=>; ;
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and
D1 <
1
2
B2;
1
4
(B6  D1)2 > 1
4

B6   1
2
B2
2
:
So
1
8
B21 Pr (Y1 = AH)
>
8><>:
1
4
 
B5   12B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
+1
4
(B6  D1)2 Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
9>=>;
>
8><>:
1
4
 
B5   12B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
+1
4
 
B6   12B2
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
9>=>; :
1b)
1
8
B22 Pr (Y1 = AL)

8><>:
1
4
 
B7   12B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AH)
+1
4
 
B8   12B2
2
Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AL)
9>=>; :
This is equivalent to prove
1
8
B22 
1
4

B7   1
2
B1
2
;
1
8
B22 
1
4

B8   1
2
B2
2
:
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(1) First, we prove 1
8
B22  14
 
B7   12B1
2
.
1
8
B22 
1
4

B7   1
2
B1
2
0B@ AH

(1 )
(1 )+(1 )  
p
2+
p
2
2

+(1 )(1 )

+AL

(1 )
(1 )+(1 ) +
p
2
2
(1 )(1 )
+(1 )(1 ) +
p
2 (1  )

1CA  0 ;
if  >  

6+9
p
2 8p22+2
p
 6+6p2 5p22+ 11
2
2 2p2+2 2p2 4

 8 20p2+16p22+6p2+4 where  2 (0:5; 1) ; 
 (1  )
(1  )+  (1  )  
p
2+
p
2
2

 + (1  ) (1  )
!
< 0:
We know that AH
AL


1 +
(+(1 )(1 ))(2+(1 )2(1 ))
(32+(1 2)(1 ))

. Taking the rst deriv-
ative of

1 +
(+(1 )(1 ))(2+(1 )2(1 ))
(32+(1 2)(1 ))

over  and , we nd that it is
decreasing with  and , so AH
AL
< 1:38.
0B@ AH

(1 )
(1 )+(1 )  
p
2+
p
2
2

+(1 )(1 )

+AL

(1 )
(1 )+(1 ) +
p
2
2
(1 )(1 )
+(1 )(1 ) +
p
2 (1  )

1CA
>
0B@ 1:38L

(1 )
(1 )+(1 )  
p
2+
p
2
2

+(1 )(1 )

+AL

(1 )
(1 )+(1 ) +
p
2
2
(1 )(1 )
+(1 )(1 ) +
p
2 (1  )

1CA
> 0:
Else
 
 (1  )
(1  )+  (1  )  
p
2+
p
2
2

 + (1  ) (1  )
!
> 0:
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0B@ AH

(1 )
(1 )+(1 )  
p
2+
p
2
2

+(1 )(1 )

+AL

(1 )
(1 )+(1 ) +
p
2
2
(1 )(1 )
+(1 )(1 ) +
p
2 (1  )

1CA
>
0B@ AL

(1 )
(1 )+(1 )  
p
2+
p
2
2

+(1 )(1 )

+AL

(1 )
(1 )+(1 ) +
p
2
2
(1 )(1 )
+(1 )(1 ) +
p
2 (1  )

1CA
=
1
2
AL

3
p
2  4
p
2+ 2

> 0:
(2) Next, we prove 1
8
B22  14
 
B8   12B2
2
:
1
8
B22 
1
4

B8   1
2
B2
2
B2 
p
2

B8   1
2
B2

 
1 +
p
2
2
!
B2  
p
2B8  0:
Since

1 +
p
2
2

>
p
2 and B2 > B8, So

1 +
p
2
2

B2  
p
2B8  0:
2b) We will prove
D1

1
2
B2   1
2
D1

Pr (Y1 = AL)
>
8><>:
1
4
 
B7   12B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AH)
+1
4
(B8  D1)2 Pr (Y1 = AL; Y2 = AL)
9>=>; :
This is equivalent to prove
D1

1
2
B2   1
2
D1

>
1
4

B7   1
2
B1
2
;
D1

1
2
B2   1
2
D1

>
1
4
(B8  D1)2 :
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(1) We prove that D1 > 1p2
 
B7   12B1

:
D1 >
1p
2

B7   1
2
B1

,
p
2B1  
p
2
2
B3  B7 + 1
2
B1 >
p
2
2
p
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3)
,
 p
2B1  
p
2
2
B3  B7 + 1
2
B1
!2
>
1
2
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3)
,
 p
2B1  
p
2
2
B3  B7 + 1
2
B1
!2
  1
2
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3) > 0:
p
2B1  
p
2
2
B3  B7 + 12B1
2
  1
2
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3) is decreasing with B3, so
 p
2B1  
p
2
2
B3  B7 + 1
2
B1
!2
  1
2
(B1  B3) (3B1  B3)
>
 p
2B1  B7 + 1
2
B1
2
  3
2
B21
!
> B27 > 0:
Hence, D1 > 1p2
 
B7   12B1

> 1p
2
 
B7   12B1

:
D1 >
1p
2

B7   1
2
B1

1
2
D21 >
1
4

B7   1
2
B1
2
1
2
D21 =
1
2
D1D1 <
1
2
D1 (B2  D1) = D1

1
2
B2   1
2
D1

:
Since q1L <
1
2
B2, so
1
2
D21 <
1
2
D1 (B2  D1) = D1

1
2
B2   1
2
D1

D1

1
2
B2   1
2
D1

>
1
4

B7   1
2
B1
2
:
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(2)
D1

1
2
B2   1
2
D1

>
1
4
(B8  D1)2 :
Since B2 > B8, so D1
 
1
2
B2   12D1

> D1
 
1
2
B8   12D1

:
If 1
2
D1 (B8  D1)>14 (B8  D1)2, i.e., D1>B83 , 12D1 (B2  D1)>14 (B8  D1)2.
So we only need to prove D1 > B83 . We know that D1 is the lower root of equation
q1L
 
B1   12B3   12q1L

= 1
8
B21 . Taking q1L =
B8
3
into 1
8
B21 q1L
 
B1   12B3   12q1L

,
we get
1
8
B21   q1L

B1   1
2
B3   1
2
q1L

=
1
8
B21  
1
3
B1B8 +
1
18
B28 +
1
6
B3B8
>
1
72
(3B1   4B8)2  0:
Hence D1 > B83 :
2a)
1
8
B21 Pr (Y1 = AH)
>
8><>:
1
4
 
B5   12B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
+1
4
(B6  D1)2 Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
9>=>; :
D1>
1p
2
 
B7   12B1

>1
2
 
B7   12B1

;
so 8><>:
1
4
 
B5   12B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
+1
4
(B6  D1)2 Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
9>=>;
<
8><>:
1
4
 
B5   12B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
+1
4
 
1
2
B7 +
1
4
B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
9>=>; :
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Take (29), (30) and (31) into
1
8
B21 Pr (Y1 = AH)  14
 
B5   12B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
 1
4
 
1
2
B7 +
1
4
B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
and we know that  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0:5; 1), so
8><>:
1
8
B21 Pr (Y1 = AH)  14
 
B5   12B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)
 1
4
 
1
2
B7 +
1
4
B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
9>=>; > 0;
that is,
1
8
B21 Pr (Y1 = AH)
>
8><>:
1
4
 
B5   12B1
2
Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AH)+
1
4
(B6  D1)2 Pr (Y1 = AH ; Y2 = AL)
9>=>; :
In sum, the leader earns more ex ante prot than the follower.
Proof of Lemma 7. From Lemma 6, we know that rmsstrategies are given
by
q^1 =
1
2
E [AjY1] ;
q^2 =
1
2

E [AjY1; Y2]  1
2
E [AjY1]

:
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We require the total output quantity less than AL, i.e.,8>>>><>>>>:
q^1 + q^

2  AL
0  q^1
0  q^2
)
8>>>><>>>>:
1
2
E [AjY1] + 12
 
E [AjY1; Y2]  12E [AjY1]
  AL
0  q^1  AL
0  q^2  AL
)
8><>: AL  E [AjY1] 
4
3
AL
AL  E [AjY1; Y2]  32E [AjY1]
:
q^1   q^2 =
1
2
E [AjY1]  1
2

E [AjY1; Y2]  1
2
E [AjY1]

=
3
4
E [AjY1]  1
2
E [AjY1; Y2]
 3
4
E [AjY1]  1
2
3
2
E [AjY1]
= 0:
so q1  q2 regardless of the demand signals they observe.
Firmsrealized prots are given by
1 = q

1 (A  q1   q2) ;
2 = q

2 (A  q1   q2) :
Since q1  q2, then 1  2. So the leader always earns more ex ante prot than
that of the followers.
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